

THE LIVING AGE



CONTENTS *for August 1, 1930*

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THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May, 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE succeeding *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: 'The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world: so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries.'

THE GUIDE POST

BEGINNING with the next number, which will be in the mail September first, *THE LIVING AGE* in increased volume will be published once a month, instead of twice a month as during the past year. The reasons for the change were discussed at length with our subscribers before the step was taken. Many of our friends were kind enough to contribute to this discussion (some of their comments have appeared in the correspondence columns of the magazine from time to time); and it was largely the weight of their arguments which finally persuaded us that our readers will in the long run be better served by a monthly *LIVING AGE*. No longer can a semi-monthly than a monthly periodical compete in timeliness with the weeklies and daily newspapers, but with a monthly magazine we can achieve a more considered viewpoint, and the added pages will enable us 'to strike more notes at the same time,' as a correspondent recently put it, the increased volume allowing a 'greater variety, a better balance and rounding out of each number of the magazine,' as another correspondent felicitously described the possibilities of the monthly plan.

The general format of the magazine will not be modified, and the present editorial policy will remain unchanged, though we shall, between now and September, give careful consideration to other urgings which have come from our friends, one being that we shall present selections of a purely literary character in each number of *THE LIVING AGE*, another that we shall include, from time to time, an item in the original text, where its peculiarity is such that flavor and significance would be impaired by even the most skillful translation.

The present management of *THE LIVING AGE* desires to be increasingly responsive to the subscriber consensus, continuing to produce a magazine which its readers may feel 'a kind of ownership

in,' as Mr. Bennett, of Peoria, Illinois, recently expressed the idea. Doubtless it would be vain to hope to produce a periodical, every portion of which would please every subscriber, but we may, in all humility, expect to publish a magazine in every number of which every subscriber will find some one thing to justify and confirm his good will.

EUROPE'S reaction to the new American tariff rates has not been unexpected, but it is interesting to get the details. *PROTECTION RUN WILD* in this issue includes three views, selected from the French and British press. One is almost persuaded that there is something wrong somewhere in an international economic policy which so deeply disturbs our friends across seas. But in spite of the unanimity of these writers in declaring that reprisals should be undertaken, an impression is created that nothing demonstrating keen resentment will be done about it for a while; which may be just as well for the harried American investor's equanimity.

A GOOD many problems are created by the existence of France's vast colonial empire. Yet in most discussions of peaceful international relations, they are passed over with no more than a murmur, which usually comes from the French alone. Some of the implications of the Frenchman's attitude toward his colonies are pointed out in this issue in *FRANCE BUILDS AN EMPIRE*. The author, *HERR VON SCHNITZLER*, happens to be a German; but he writes from the point of view of one who is interested in the peaceful settlement of a problem which may one day set statesmen's plans awry.

THE modern Frenchman does not gain anything by suggesting that Germany and his other former enemies are weak

(Continued on page 689)

THE LIVING AGE

Founded by E. Littell

In 1844



August 1, 1930

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The World Over

TEN YEARS AFTER the Versailles Treaty was signed the last French troops evacuated the Rhineland, accompanied by a storm of comment from both sides of Germany's historic stream. The reactionary newspapers of France maintained the same swaggering attitude they have been striking since 1870—an attitude which a diminishing number of French citizens share, if we are to judge from the continued growth of the left-wing parties, whose organs of opinion take a much more conciliatory line. Defeated Germany, on the other hand, in spite of her reactionary Government, indulged in fewer extravagances, having learned from Stresemann the rewards of prudence. But all German papers, reactionary and progressive alike, insisted that the evacuation was not a gift but an act of justice and that the Saar basin, too, must be freed from French control.

In spite of the present dangerous tension between France and Italy, European peace cannot be seriously threatened as long as France and Germany keep on good terms with each other and for that reason several of the comments that were made while the French troops were withdrawing deserve to be recorded. Perhaps the most carefully studied piece of nastiness came out in the *Echo de Paris*, which sent a special correspondent to Mainz, where he reported that many Rhinelanders regretted the departure of so many good customers. In other words, a foreign military occupation, paid for by the occupied country, seems to be the ideal solution for trade depression. The same corre-

spondent then gave this moving account of General Guillaumat's farewell to his troops:—

The most pathetic moment was when the general in command, leaving his palace, approached his troops just as they were changing guard for the last night's watch. I myself approached rapidly, for General Guillaumat was speaking these words in a very low voice: 'My friends, you are the last arrivals here; you were children when the War broke out; you feel as I do that this day is unforgettable. Remember what you have seen here and what you have done. I say no more. Farewell, my friends.' With these last words the voice of the old general choked and I saw tears running down his motionless face.

Le Temps adopted a more conciliatory tone:—

It has been repeated times without number that the end of the occupation will succeed in dissipating all that is evil from Franco-German relations, that it alone will be able to hasten and complete the *rapprochement* that should serve as the solid basis of durable peace. The moment has come for the Germans to demonstrate this before the eyes of an attentive Europe. Let them rejoice in the liberation of their national soil,—nothing is more natural,—but already certain newspaper reports make us fear that certain elements beyond the Rhine that have not yet renounced all hope of revenge do not intend to exploit this event in a way that will assist the cause of conciliation. What spirit will prevail in Germany now that this occupation is ended? What will be the tendencies of German policy now that the essential end for which Gustav Stresemann worked has been achieved? With the new era a new experience begins and the safety of Europe compels us to hope that its results will not be disappointing.

Léon Blum, Socialist editor of *Le Populaire*, described the evacuation as the final consecration of peace between France and Germany:—

What does it prove? It proves that we Socialists have been right for the past ten years. It proves that the necessity of things finally imposes itself, even on those who oppose it most bitterly. It proves that in spite of everything such a thing as international will exists. It proves that Europe wants peace and that it has understood that the reestablishment of normal relations between France and Germany is the first if not the final condition of peace.

The atmosphere of sentimental rejoicing that prevailed in Germany did not encourage the formulation of elaborate political plans. The following passage from a leading article by Theodor Wolff, editor of the liberal *Berliner Tageblatt*, sums up the enlightened German point of view:—

Often when Stresemann was talking to his friends of the day on which the Rhineland would eventually be free he would say, 'The doctors have forbidden me to drink, but on that day I shall get drunk with joy and I shall not care what prohibitions have been made.' He can no longer go against doctors' orders, but all of you will share my opinion that the first glass of Rhine wine that we empty

to-day should be drunk in his memory. Truly, my fellow countrymen, the moral courage that he showed is worth a thousand times more than all that stilted heroism of phrase and gesture that prevails on the parade grounds under steel helmets and other symbols of reaction. Men and women of the German Republic, follow his example so that all members of the Cabinet may, like us, follow him and be filled with his spirit!

AT ITS FIRST meeting since the Hague conferences settled the dispute between Hungary and Rumania, the Little Entente, consisting of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, confined itself to discussions of a general nature. A three-day conference between the foreign ministers of these three states, held in the heart of the Carpathian Mountains, brought forth only a declaration that they all agreed to respect their international agreements. Cynics might be pardoned for inquiring why three reputable diplomats feel it necessary to take so much trouble to assert that they actually intend to respect their words of honor, but what the statement really means is that the Little Entente will not countenance the accession of Otto to the Hungarian throne, since the peace treaties expressly forbid a return of the Hapsburgs. But aside from this inferential statement, the conference produced almost nothing. William Martin, foreign editor of the *Journal de Genève*, points out that the Little Entente must work toward a customs union in which Rumania and Yugoslavia, the two agricultural countries, will supply raw materials and Czechoslovakia, the industrial state, will supply manufactured goods on a free-trade basis. A successful arrangement of this kind might then persuade industrialized Austria and agricultural Hungary to join a general Danubian confederation. Such, in any case, is the vision of Dr. Beneš, the Czech Foreign Minister, who hopes that the Little Entente may be the seed from which a greater Europe will grow.

EXASPERATED by the long campaign of vituperation to which France has been subjected in the Italian press, *Le Temps* has devoted a leading editorial to analyzing the causes of Fascist malevolence. It likens most of the attacks to the anti-British outbursts that appear in the Moscow newspapers whenever a domestic crisis threatens, but it places in a different category a recent article by Arnaldo Mussolini, brother of the Duce and editor of the *Popolo d'Italia*. Not only does this article by reason of its authorship possess a more official character than most contributions to Fascist newspapers but it flatly asserts that Mussolini's warlike speeches have been made in reply to the aggressive military preparations of the French. Arnaldo did, to be sure, admit that Italy is now divided into three groups—ardent Fascists, half-hearted Fascists, and defeatists—and *Le Temps* takes some comfort in the thought that

the *Popolo d'Italia* is merely trying to bring the defeatists into line. But, *Le Temps* concludes, if Arnaldo believes that he has convinced the outer world that France, not Italy, is the aggressor, he has indeed misunderstood the essence of Briand's memorandum suggesting a federated Europe.

It was a skillful and significant manœuvre for the mouthpiece of the French Foreign Office to go out of its way to mention the Briand memorandum as a proof of its peaceful intentions, since the chief result of this memorandum has been to distract attention from a proposal to increase the already enormous military expenditures of France over a period of years. Of course the Italians have not neglected to emphasize this point, but as usual they have overstated the case and asserted that part of the extra appropriations will go to buying war material for the Yugoslav army, whereas in point of fact France has pressing cares in other quarters. Briand's Locarno policy of French, British, German, and Italian coöperation has broken down and he is busily strengthening himself in the east, fearing trouble between Poland and Germany now that the Rhineland has been evacuated. It is in Eastern and Central Europe that his proposals for a federated continent based on the *status quo* have received most sympathy and it is in that quarter that he needs most support.

WE HAVE NEVER ceased attempting to discount in these columns the despairing interpretations of modern England that keep flooding its press and to which we give the same prominence that they enjoy in the country of their origin. Indeed we have more than once suggested that this consistent attitude of self-depreciation arises—consciously or unconsciously—from a desire on the part of the British to encourage rash overconfidence among their competitors. We are therefore gratified to find no less an authority than Mr. John Maynard Keynes explaining to a group of women delegates from national councils of women overseas that the present condition of England is excellent. Here are two of his more striking paragraphs:—

We in this country have for twenty-five years been carrying out one of the greatest social experiments in history, the equalization of wealth and the abolition of the worst kinds of poverty. Because we live in the middle of them we have overlooked the changes. The well-to-do classes in this country are poorer than they were, but for the great bulk of the people the change in the standard of life has been most remarkable. It has been carried through by governments of every political party, quietly and peacefully, in spite of the Great War. It has been done not only by the increment of wealth, but by the willingness of the richer classes to submit to the subtraction of their wealth.

When people compare us with the countries in Europe, they should remember that for the ordinary worker we are supporting a standard of life forty-five

per cent higher than that in France. England is still far and away the richest country in Europe, and by no means at an end of progress. It is four times as rich as a hundred years ago. I would predict with absolute confidence that a hundred years hence we shall be at least eight times as rich as we are now.

More practical evidence of a similar nature is to be found in the speech of Sir Hugo Hirst, chairman of the General Electric Company of Great Britain, who pointed out to a meeting of stockholders that profits had increased nearly 10 per cent in the past year and who also stated that the company's export business, 'now running into millions,' is 'nearly double what it was four or five years ago.'

BOLIVIA has been suffering from one of those internal disputes that are becoming typical of nearly all Latin-American countries. Hernando Siles, former President, has resigned under pressure after attempting to prolong his term by refusing to allow the election of his successor to be held at the appointed time. Dr. Bautista Saavedra, the predecessor of Siles, had hoped to succeed him in office, since it is unconstitutional for the same man to occupy the Bolivian presidency for two successive terms. But even the presence of Saavedra's brother Abdon in the vice presidency failed to check the ambitions of Siles, who was supported by the commander in chief of the army. The bulk of the officers, however, turned against Siles and their leader, both of whom had become identified with 'Yankee imperialism.' The fact is that North American interests have penetrated the nations of Latin America so successfully that the various parties in power are almost invariably identified with those interests. Bolivia, for instance, has run up a huge foreign debt, more than one-third of her \$17,500,000 budget for 1930 being earmarked for payments to foreign bondholders. Furthermore, no additional credit is forthcoming, though American oil companies are said to be willing to advance money to both Paraguay and Bolivia to help them adjust their differences in the Chaco district and develop it as an outlet for petroleum. Dr. Siles's alleged negotiations with these companies have helped to increase his unpopularity and have led *El Sol* of Madrid to remark: 'The revolutionary movement in Bolivia, according to one of its leaders, is directed against imperialist despotism and one of its purposes is to nationalize the oil wells and mines. In fact, the United States hastened to assure the former government of its support in crushing this uprising.'

The new American tariff has all Europe by the ears. Here are some typical outbursts showing what Tories and Communists, Frenchmen and Englishmen really think of the Hawley-Smoot Bill.

Protection *Run Wild*

A EUROPEAN
SYMPOSIUM

I. WANTING THE WORLD

From the *Morning Post*, London Conservative Daily

WE DO NOT SHARE the surprise of some of our contemporaries that the American Tariff Revision Bill has sailed triumphantly into port. There was nothing—and nobody—to stop it. It is true that Mr. Hoover gave election pledges against an upward revision; but in practice the President does not decide such matters. The revision rests on the solid foundation of an understanding between the manufacturers and the farmers, who accepted one another's highest rates. If British industry and British agriculture were wise and broad-minded enough to come together in the same way, they too might dictate a policy based on production. Against such a combination no political party could stand. The Democrats, who used to be not so much a free-trade as a low-tariff party, swung round so far in 1928 as to deny that there was any longer any difference of principle between them and the Republicans on the fiscal issue. Nor was this surprising, since the industrialization of the southern states, to which the Democrats look for their support, has made even the South protectionist.

The American tariff law of 1922 was chiefly directed against Great Britain. 'It is certain,' said the Balfour Committee, 'that in staple lines of manufactures, in which quantity and low price are important factors, the tariff has rendered competition from the United Kingdom practically impossible.' This present 'revision' reinforces the blow by increasing the duties on such things as oils and paints, metal ware, chemicals, crockery, textiles, clothing, and so forth. The American market

was, even before, the most highly protected in the world; the average rate on manufactures is now nearly 40 per cent, and practically everything is covered. We notice that some innocents hope for relief from the 'flexible' provision, which gives the President power to increase or decrease the duty on any commodity up to 50 per cent of the amount fixed by law. But, if we may judge by the previous history of the use of this power, it will be used, not to mitigate, but to increase severity. Thus, of the thirty-six changes by this executive decree between 1922 and 1928, only five were decreases (and on unimportant commodities); the increases were usually up to the limit of 50 per cent. When, therefore, the *Times* hopes that this power may enable the President 'to amend some of the most glaring defects of the bill,' we are inclined to smile. As an American writer puts it, the United States 'not only wants the world, but the world with a fence round it.'

Great Britain has not only been more moderate; she has erred in the other direction, and thrown her markets, and, where she has had the power, the markets of the British Empire open to the United States and to the world. We have never believed in such altruism—if altruism it can be called—nor do we complain when America teaches us this severe lesson in national selfishness. American statesmen have their duty to their own country and to nobody else. So far from trying to contract out of the struggle for existence they rejoice in it—as a strong man to run a race. It would be contemptible, therefore, either to squeal or to scold; our duty is rather to take our own measures for our own defense. And here let us point out that the American tariff is directed not only against Great Britain, but against all the British dominions and colonies, and especially Canada, since not only manufactures but raw produce are shut out of the American market. There we have something which ought to bring the Empire together, as it was brought together by the action of Germany in 1914. It is unfortunate, indeed, that, just as then Germany thought she could discount British statesmanship, so now the United States think they have nothing to fear from the weak and disunited economic policy of the British Empire. Canada has taken the first step to show that they are mistaken; it remains for Great Britain to follow that excellent example.

II. AMERICA DECLARES A TARIFF HOLIDAY

By Marcel Cachin

Translated from *L'Humanité*, Paris Communist Daily

BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS in the United States have passed the famous tariff bill that imposes duties of three billion extra francs on hundreds of different products. Already the American tariff yields a

revenue of sixteen billion francs a year and thus the United States becomes the most protectionist country in the universe. It is virtually closing its frontiers to European goods.

French capitalists attack such measures violently. Not long ago some forty thousand people stormed through the streets of Calais, protesting against the menace that threatened to wipe out an essential market for the tulle that they manufacture. More recently Mr. Walter Edge, the new American ambassador in Paris, visited our northern districts, where he came in contact with our chambers of commerce. He heard some rude home truths at Roubaix, where that great employer, Georges Motte, uttered in public some very thinly veiled protests. He spoke of the 'tariff intransigence' of Mr. Edge's country. He protested that this declaration of economic war did not respect the rules of 'fair play.' And in the presence of the bewildered diplomat this proud representative of the Motte dynasty announced that the north French capitalists were going to fight, and show 'who they are and what they are worth.'

For a long time past the Communists have been the only party to give a sincere analysis of the great economic events that have followed the War. They have insisted on proving the increasing instability of capitalism and have been widely reproached for their gloomy prophecies. But facts and realities are justifying their assertions. While democrats and socialists are swooning with pleasure over speeches made at Geneva and the Hague, the various world imperialisms are increasing their aggressions in every way. The vote of the American Congress gives a clear reply to all the silly talk that has been going on at Geneva about the 'tariff holiday.' For the fact is that we are not entering a new period of tariff holidays. On the contrary, we are turning our backs on any such policy. The United States has just performed an act of open economic war to which all other countries will naturally reply with reprisals.

Why is the United States defying all its competitors? Because it hopes by hermetically sealing its domestic market to put an end to the redoubtable crisis that threatens the whole structure of its imperialism. Senator Watson, one of the advocates of the tariff bill, has declared that within thirty days after it goes into effect the nation will emerge from the disastrous events of last October and November and he added that within a year the United States will have returned to the peak of prosperity. This senator is something of a bluffer. After the crash of 1929 President Hoover himself promptly declared that it was only a stock-exchange affair and that it would have no serious economic consequences. But subsequent events have exploded this affirmation. Every day the economic condition of the United States grows worse. Of the country's thirty million paid workers, more than one-fourth are unem-

ployed and the farm crisis is in full swing and has not spared a single farmer in the American West.

The truth is that the capitalists in the United States have been obliged by the economic system to sharpen international antagonism. Their arrogant optimism has come to an end and so has that hymn to eternal prosperity which both the Socialists and President Hoover used to sing. For events have recalled this business-man President to the Marxian laws that govern capitalist development and to the unavoidable crises that arise.

The aggressiveness of the United States will not be confined to the already grave manifestation that this tariff bill embodies. American imperialism will go much further in its attempts to overcome the present crisis. It is fighting for its markets and for its world hegemony and will find its way blocked by England and the capitalist nations of Europe, who are going to close their markets and the markets of their colonial possessions to American products. But the United States will not allow indispensable markets to be shut down in this fashion. It will not permit its need for expansion to be checked. It will raise the problem of dividing up the world in some new way. It will use all its economic strength and its financial monopoly to shatter all obstacles that stand in its path. The tariff war which has just begun is merely the first of a series of further aggressive acts that will intensify the economic, social, and political crisis that is assailing every part of the capitalist world.

III. LIFE OR DEATH FOR EUROPE

By Edouard Herriot

Translated from L'Ère Nouvelle, Paris Left-Wing Daily

NEWS DISPATCHES inform us that after President Hoover had signed the tariff bill in the presence of Mr. Mellon and several other eminent personages all those present applauded loudly. Joy in America. Lamentation in Europe. The bill which has now gone into force in every American port puts our very lives at stake. Importers tried to rush their goods through the customs before the new law went into effect and in a single half day no less than eleven million dollars were paid in duties in New York alone.

The Hawley-Smoot tariff is going to create immense perturbation in Europe. Italy has already protested that she can no longer sell her oil, her preserves, her candied fruit, and her silk goods in the United States, and certain Italian newspapers have urged lowering production costs as the only remedy. Unquestionably, industry and business will attempt to reduce expenses and America's policy of high wages is likely to create

a rival European policy of lowered wages. From now on our democratic parties and our labor organizations must keep their eyes open.

Of course, I realize that in deciding to sign the tariff bill so quickly, Mr. Hoover has retained the power to mitigate its inequalities and injustices. Foreign countries will be allowed to present their grievances and in accordance with American traditions the tariffs will not be put into effect without being fixed. None the less, Europe finds herself seriously menaced by the results of promises that the Republicans made to the American farmers. We Europeans are paying the expenses of the Republican Convention at Kansas City. In so far as industry is concerned, the policy which this bill has brought to its logical conclusion is one of protecting American manufactures and assuring high salaries to the working class. All doors must therefore be shut to products made more cheaply than the Americans can make them. Thus, as the Italian economists have clearly recognized, we are faced by the terrible danger that certain of our industrialists will be tempted to reduce the already meagre wages of their assistants, engineers, and workers.

According to President Hoover himself, the duties imposed by the tariff law of 1922 amounted to 13.8 per cent of the total value of imports, whereas the new tariff comes to 16 per cent. Such are the results that overtake a country which has gone in for overproduction and sought to achieve overconsumption. André Siegfried has just described this phenomenon in striking fashion in the *Revue politique et parlementaire*. He says that unrestrained advertising and the extension of credit selling have brought matters from bad to worse. The economic balance of the United States is like that of a man on a bicycle, who will fall if he stops and who becomes more secure the faster he travels. The American people has believed that it must adopt a standard of living above the average, and it has confused the profits of speculation with the wages for work performed. The implements of production have been unrestrainedly increased. The whole system, as Siegfried says, is devised to function on a rising tide. 'If this tide stops flowing and begins to ebb, how will the system emerge from such a test?'

Certain French newspapers are already urging a campaign of reprisals. Their emotions can readily be understood. The European nations are going to have to pay the United States huge war debts without being able to sell any goods over there. What a problem and what a drama! A splendid subject for economist and statesman to work over and to reflect upon. But we Europeans will not overcome this enormous difficulty by crying aloud. The United States resembles an immense fortress. Are we simply going to walk about its walls lamenting? That would be laughable. But must we then give ear to people who are already uttering hostile words? Certainly not. Though our discussions with the United States may be bitter, we must not forget, even though

the Americans have often misunderstood it, our cordial wartime fellowship.

But the problem is of the deepest gravity. All European statesmen worthy of the name must study it at once with the greatest coolness. If they do not do so, if we do not act together, our industries will be either ruined or bought up, our poor workers who live from day to day will be threatened with unemployment and misery, and our technical experts will face extinction. Reprisals are not enough. We must institute at the earliest possible moment a European order, a European *entente*, a European division of work, a systematized Europe.

It is a question of life and death. Democrats, representatives of labor of all degrees, open your eyes.

Patterning herself on ancient Rome, not modern Britain, France has erected the second largest colonial empire in the world. A sympathetic German discusses these labors and hazards a prophecy.

France Builds an EMPIRE

By WERNER VON SCHNITZLER

Translated from the *Europäische Revue*
Berlin International Monthly

DURING THE HAGUE CONFERENCE Tardieu spoke to the journalists about the French empire and emphasized the fact that his country possessed the second largest colonial system in the world. This attitude of his corresponded to the ideas of one of his fellow countrymen who had been demanding that France cultivate an imperial mentality similar to the British imperial consciousness, which makes even the poorest Welsh miner feel that events in India and Egypt concern him personally. But if the French lack such a world-wide point of view in

spite of their great oversea possessions there are good reasons for it, since their patriotism is confined to the geographic area of their native country. In relation to their oversea empire they lack the imperial spirit, at least in the ordinary meaning attached to that phrase, the difficulty being that tutelage over other peoples must be exercised through a decentralized control, whereas the French look upon their oversea possessions as a kind of extension of their own country.

This idea of centralized colonies radiating about the mother country underlies all of French colonial policy and has made itself felt throughout French colonial history. Of course all colonial empires are based on selfish foundations, but the others have been built from the surplus strength and population of the mother country, whereas the French empire has been erected without any such aid. Even in the early days of modern colonizing when France was still the most populous country in Europe, its inhabitants never emigrated on a scale comparable to the flood of British settlers who went to North America, and when the real modern colonial period began France was a country of more or less stable population surrounded by countries with rapidly growing populations. In the first half of the nineteenth century and even more so in the second half, the various colonial empires assumed their characteristic colonial shapes. British imperial consciousness is at least fifty years old, but the creation of 'Greater France' is the work of the Third Republic, whose colonial ambitions date from the lost war of 1870, when the population and world significance of France declined. The specifically French conception of patriotism and the nature of the French colonial empire's development have restricted French colonial policy and have prevented any modification of its aims such as the modern world rightly demands of all nations whose power extends widely over the earth's surface.

FOR modern colonial policy has been modified by the moral conviction of the world that each colonial power is responsible for educating the people it rules in the ways of self-government, and modern colonial nations have come to hope that they can continue to profit when their former vassals have been set free. But in North Africa France has renounced any intention of granting independence, not, of course, in so many words but in point of fact, and all her future plans assume a continuation of French rule. In short, the North Africans must become French or renounce all hope of self-government. Here is what M. Augustin Bernard wrote in *Algérie*, and hundreds of similar pronouncements have been made: 'We do not want to coerce the North Africans but we want it clearly understood that we are just as much at home there as they are. France has fastened herself with all the fibres of her

soul to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunis and looks upon them less as colonies than as parts of the mother country. North Africa is neither a dominion like Canada, nor a subject nation like India, nor a crown colony like Jamaica. France has taken over the work that Rome used to perform when she incorporated provinces into her empire. We want to make all our African subjects, regardless of their racial origins, into a single people who will accept our speech as their common language. This common relationship will gradually produce a unified will.'

The North Africans cannot be prevailed upon to renounce Islam but they can be persuaded to use the French language. 'It is not up to us to urge the natives to give up their Mohammedan beliefs but it is by no means chimerical to hope to make them French-speaking people. The most distinguished students of Arabic agree that Arabian speech and writing provide a very inadequate means of understanding, while the Berber language has no possibilities whatever. There is therefore no reason why the North Africans should not learn French just as they learned Punic, Latin, and Arabic in the past.'

Meanwhile the Mohammedans remain indifferent. They learn French well enough when the opportunity offers but their attitude remains hostile. The Mohammedans are ungrateful, and the Tharaud brothers—Jérôme and Jean—have described them as follows in an account of their recent journey through Morocco written for the *Revue des Deux Mondes*: 'In Morocco, Tunis, Egypt, India, and China, wherever Europeans have opened schools, the same motto can appropriately be written over all of them, "School of Ingratitude." Never do the pupils give us credit for having their interests at heart. Even the technical inventions that we have brought them, like automobiles and telephones, which they use for all they are worth, do not excite their admiration. They believe themselves superior to us because we do not understand the truth of Islam.' The rich citizens of Fez who have enjoyed great material prosperity from French rule are described by the Tharauds as follows: 'Proud, cynical, corrupt, narrow-minded, jealous of each other, ever eager to criticise and loath to recognize the duties that should be demanded of them.'

WITH such a deep abyss separating the rulers from the ruled, it is hard to see how a new homogeneous race of Africans and Europeans can ever be erected, though a blend of the various European immigrants might well be achieved. Indeed, a new type of French inhabitant is being developed from the Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Italians who have settled there, and this tendency should continue, provided the intense political nationalism which animates the Italians in Tunis does not raise insuperable barriers. Unquestionably, Algeria is the master-

piece of French colonial effort. Fourteen per cent of its population are French Europeans who have allowed the native leaders to share their power, though in spite of all efforts Islam still presents a considerable obstacle.

The fact is that religion, in one form or another, always remains the chief barrier throughout North Africa. Everywhere it forms a connecting link that unites Arabs, Berbers, and negroes in their common fatalistic convictions and in their belief that Christian rule may bring material advantages but that it is an unlawful and unholy rule that cannot last long and must some day disappear. All French authors agree that Mohammedan hostility is the chief obstacle to French ambitions in Africa. Open opposition to Islam would of course be the worst possible policy. The British contend that before the War the French administration in West Africa tried to encourage the fetish worship of the natives as a means of combating Islam and that the Christian missions relaxed their zeal temporarily in order to assist this process. Whether or not these charges are true, this much at least is certain—that in Morocco the anti-Arabic and anti-Mohammedan tendencies of the Berbers enjoy the sympathy of the French.

If the French colonies outside North Africa are not regarded as an integral part of the mother country it is not because different principles are applied there but because they are so far away. 'Nowhere,' says Duchêne in his *Histoire Coloniale de la France*, 'has France associated herself with one of those noteworthy federations, similar to the British dominions, which are held fast to the mother country by the bond of loyalty alone. France has no group of possessions important enough to be separated from the rest of her colonial domain. Thus her colonial activities must differ as her various colonies differ, though this much can be said, that the words "citizen," "subject," and "protégé," which describe the inhabitants of the lands we rule, are merely given names and that French is the family name they all bear.'

Nevertheless, the Asiatic peoples, the Annamites, for instance, have their own extremely ancient national names which the French cannot ignore. Furthermore, these peoples live in a foreign atmosphere worlds apart from France. Black Africa occupies a different situation. Here, during the past few years, French colonial policy has been achieving its long cherished aim of binding together northern, western, and central Africa with improved automobile and air services. The idea of a vast, united French Northwest Africa has quite intoxicated the French and has become widely popular. We find, for instance, a typical example of this attitude in the *Œuvre*, a radical left-wing paper which contained this statement in its first of March, 1930, issue: 'Eighty million French-speaking people in a firmly knit stretch of territory—France, northern and central Africa—form an army that enables

us to march forward with the sure knowledge that the future of our race is secure.'

HOWEVER doubtful the ultimate success of this great plan may appear, the French themselves display no lack of zeal in pursuing it. Whether or not the trans-Saharan railway is ever constructed makes no great difference since from a military point of view—and all of French African policy is dominated by the military factor—automobile communication is now entirely adequate. Nevertheless, the railway will eventually be built. François Marsal, president of the Union Coloniale, has said of it, 'It is less an instrument of commerce than of propaganda, since it will bring people together and through cultivating a community of interests will eventually bind them to a common ideal.' But commercial considerations will not be forgotten. All the country from Timbuktu to the Niger, hot though it is in summer, is nevertheless a comparatively healthy climate for Europeans and could be made into a second Egypt, but to achieve all these far-reaching plans men are needed, French-speaking individuals skilled in French technique. For that reason schools have been established and the spread of the French language throughout French Africa is being stimulated as vigorously as the recruiting of native laborers. Meanwhile, what do the Africans themselves have to say? Up to now they have scarcely been consulted, but the unification of their continent and the improvement of their transportation system gives them an opportunity to develop a sense of common understanding that they have never been capable of before.

The French believe that they are the best colonizers in the world and the only people who are really able to understand and develop native peoples. This belief is, of course, merely a matter of principle, and French writers do not even mention the fact that compulsory recruiting of negroes for military and civil services often involves frightful hardships. Instead of dwelling on such matters they affirm that, to the English, colonizing merely represents a commercial undertaking. England, they say, acquires only the land, not the souls of its subjects. They assert that this has led to suppression and exploitation in North America, South Africa, and Oceania unequaled anywhere in French colonial history, and that where England has succeeded in developing and improving its subjects, as in India and Egypt, permanent settlement, the foundation stone of true colonization, is lacking.

The fact is that the French attitude toward races of a different color differs fundamentally from the English. The Frenchman recognizes no difference in principle, hence he never abandons his hope of assimilating other races, although a hundred years should have shown him the futility of this idea. Yet it is a rather sympathetic trait that even the

most reactionary Frenchman cannot suppress a certain sense of human rights deep in his bosom. The remote attitude of the Englishman seems to him superior and heartless. Although French colonial policy has varied from an ideal of complete assimilation in 1789 to self-determination under the Restoration, to subordination under the Second Empire, and finally to a policy of association under the Third Republic, the fundamental attitude of the Frenchman toward colored races has never altered. This attitude represents the one quality, a quality not to be underestimated, which may make French control more tolerable than the control of any other power.

But a skillful application of the present theory of association is democratic in theory alone. Now, as always, French tactics consist in developing a new ruling race, made up of natives, colonizers, and Frenchmen, which will help administer each colony without paying too much attention to democratic principles. France has never held any conventions similar to the British Imperial Conferences which the most experienced colonial officials and the elected representatives of the colonies attend, and this comparison with England only goes to show the radical difference between the French and British colonial empires.

THE British Empire cannot be defined in any strict terms of statecraft but is a living organism of constantly changing countries. Especially since the War the tempo of British imperial development has altered, and not only the outer world but the English themselves have been amazed and are wondering what will happen to this gigantic structure of theirs. The fact is that the mother country and its six dominions of Canada, Newfoundland, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and Ireland are only held together in the British Commonwealth of Nations under the symbol of the crown and through a voluntary bond of loyalty. From a colonial empire based on control of the seas and ruled from London a democratic union of free peoples has developed in which London merely plays the rôle of *primus inter pares*. The reason why this British league of nations includes only the dominions and has not yet embraced the colonies is that its more backward possessions are not yet capable of any other form of administration. But, fundamentally, London has determined to make all parts of its empire as independent as its dominions.

In the past, Englishmen may have taken a rather narrow-minded attitude toward their subjects, but to-day they have displayed unmistakable evidences of liberality. In the announcement of the Secretary of State for India dated August 20, 1917, the idea that the British government intended to pursue a different policy toward white races than toward other races was definitely denied. Since that time negotia-

tions, investigations, and visits of commissions to India have occurred which represent definite progress toward raising India to dominion status, though naturally many difficulties must first be overcome. The attitude of the government in political and cultural matters is identical. Nowhere are the inhabitants forced to learn the English language. A report on the University of Calcutta discussing the teaching of native languages states: 'A foreign language can introduce new streams of thought and that is the case with English, but the mother language is the true shadow of every man and is inseparable from his personality.'

The British attitude toward the negro inhabitants of Africa was defined in the Kenya White Paper of July, 1923: 'Kenya is above all an African country and His Majesty's Government believe it appropriate to announce their maturely considered decision that the interests of the African natives must always come first, and if these interests conflict with the interests of immigrant races the former must take precedence.' In order to understand the full significance of this new attitude of the British government one must realize that it not only differs from the policy of the white settlers in Kenya and in the rest of East Africa, but that it also differs from the South African Union's native policy. Of course, certain compromises cannot be avoided. The interests of the colonists must receive some consideration and a dualistic policy has to be developed that will treat both races fairly. But no attempts will be made to transform the natives into Englishmen. The sentiment of nationality is given full play in order to consolidate the political bond. Furthermore, this policy is not one of complete centralization. It endeavors to protect the aboriginal way of life and the political institutions of the native as much as possible.

This policy has inevitably met with sharp opposition and influential interests are now at work to bind what colonizers remain more closely to the mother country by way of compensation for the independence that the dominions have gained. But these influences will not be able to check an inevitable development, especially since the essential justice of these methods is being more and more recognized. For this liberal policy, as defined by Kircher in his new book on England, is one of national egotism: 'While the British yield to democratic pressure gradually, they continue to follow the one way still open to them: to bind their empire together and make it the valuable foundation of their national economy.' Whether the colored races will lend themselves to this policy at all and, if they do so, to how great an extent they are willing to cooperate, only the future can tell.

THE French attempt to make North Africa an extension of France and to establish France as the successor of Rome represents the most

complete contrast to the democratic, decentralized British Empire. It will provide one of the most interesting chapters in modern history and in any case will profoundly modify European policy for the next decade. The fact that so much has happened without being observed speaks for the cleverness of French politicians, but the one dark aspect of their policy is that its confessed primary aim is to increase the military power of the mother country. By enlisting colored troops the French may acquire a superiority of numbers, and they can point not only to their own success in this field but to the success that Holland has won in a similar situation. But the Dutch East Indies represent something very different to Holland from what the French colonies represent to France. The Dutch have advanced the natives a long way toward independence and have granted their demands for further self-government whenever possible. But the Dutch are not concerned with extending their military power. Their thoughts are all on economic expansion. The French idea of absorption and incorporation, on the other hand, is quite different from the ideas of any other colonial nation.

At the present stage of colonial development the significance of the difference between France and other countries has not yet become entirely clear. On the other hand, the colonial peoples have not yet developed an overwhelming community of interests as against the white race. In a preface to Zimmern's *The Third British Empire*, B. Lavergne draws a clear distinction between French and British methods, which he feels conflict more in theory than in practice. Actually, the liberal British colonial policy, with which the restrictive policy of France is contrasted, proceeds under the same protection of military rule that is to be found in all other colonies. But England can hardly believe that the liberal institutions she has set up in her dominions can work in her colonies, however great their desire for independence may be. Furthermore, most French colonies for the past twenty or thirty years have boasted a *conseil colonial* similar to the British legislative council. Even more difficult to observe is the contrast between the British decentralized and the French centralized constitution, which gives the French governor general far-reaching powers. And, as far as any attempts to assimilate are concerned, France is constantly breaking away from her Utopian desires in this field.

None the less, according to Lavergne, the old French ambition to assimilate her colonial peoples abides. And though this desire may be mistaken it rests on deep foundations. For the truth is that if British India or Indo-China ever breaks away from European control it will be solely due to the fact that the inhabitants will not accept European culture. The English, for instance, take pride in having drawn clear distinctions between political and national considerations: they do as little offense as possible to national instincts; and the word 'British' has a purely politi-

cal significance, whereas the words 'English' and 'Canadian' have a cultural meaning. But before the present century comes to an end these peoples whose culture is so far removed from our own will be able to survey us closely and when they do so they will discover the false distinction England has attempted to draw between political and national considerations.

In other words, Laverigne, like all Frenchmen, does not believe in the possibility of a free India as a part of the British Empire. People of different races, he believes, can only be permanently won over by bringing European thought as close to them as possible and by endeavoring to make one's self honored and understood by them. But if we think this idea out to its conclusion it must be obvious even to French eyes that past failures of cultural penetration show that the French colonizing power must ultimately fail. When speaking of Indo-China, most Frenchmen will assure you that the best France can hope for here in the long run is to retain business relations, although this huge colony has long remained in French hands without great difficulty. But Africa must always remain with France as an extension of French soil. Indeed, this fact is so generally recognized that the problem of self-determination is much less acute in Africa than in Asia. Except for Egypt, whose case is special, no general political development in Africa can be envisaged for the moment; in any case, no development based on independence. These actual circumstances may, therefore, justify Laverigne in asserting that there are no practical differences between French and British colonial administration.

AND yet the results achieved by these two different systems are significant at the present hour. In striking contrast to the sweeping prospects of British popular democracy, France can only offer methods of control radiating from the mother country. It makes no difference whether the French call the principles by which they are guided assimilation, association, or familiar human rights; it makes no difference whether their motives are honorable and humane: they do not deceive their foreign subjects who believe that their true friend is the man who does not use them for his own political ends, who does not want to absorb them but who wishes to make them his free partners by educating them to independence. The *Round Table* for September, 1929, asked this just question: 'Will the Franco-African of the future really devote his life to the goddess, *La France*?'

An interesting answer to this British question has appeared in a book written by a Belgian, *L'Afrique centrale dans 100 ans*. The author, a judge in the Katanga Court of Appeals, describes the Europeanizing policies in the course of a solid study disguised as a prophetic novel. 'The

Europeanizing of the continent has not improved the situation of the blacks from their own point of view but has merely made hundreds of thousands of people unhappy. They yearn for the old days when they used to live in their own villages and they hate a régime that makes their lives dependent on working for foreigners.' But he praises the indirect system of government that provides for local independence, saying, 'Only in these districts does peace exist in Africa. Here only has European power created and not destroyed.'

The history of colonization is more than an interesting portion of historical science; it is a part of human history itself. For it is a fact, as Friedrich List has said, that every normal nation at some time in its life enjoys an oversupply of strength and population, of spiritual and material capital with which to found colonies and establish new nations. The Greeks and Romans in ancient times, the Arabs and Germans in the Middle Ages, later the Spanish and Portuguese, and more recently the English and the French have experienced this same urge toward expansion. Nor is this urge confined to European peoples, though it makes itself felt most strongly among them. Throughout history one great colonial empire after another has arisen, and as soon as one collapsed another took its place. Has this process come to an end? Are the French right when they say that the time has passed when maps are changed? Although the world does not protect weak nations, although competition between the great powers continues in political, economic, and cultural fields, this much is certain—that the erection of new colonial empires has become futile. And if the present empires want to justify their existence before the world they must recognize in their methods of government that the ideas of political domination that were in vogue before the War no longer hold true and have been replaced by a new conception based on the theory of mandates.

Henry de Jouvenel writes in this vein in the *Revue des Vivants* for January, 1930, when he asserts that France, in taking the initiative for a United States of Europe, has also opened up the question of a colonial federation. The demands for free trade could be much more easily realized outside Europe and he urges France not to be alarmed that Germany and Italy are making similar demands, but to try to find some method of coöperation with these countries. But this is going too far. All that is needed is a renunciation of the present policy of absorption, which makes any economic coöperation between France and any other nation impossible. It is unjust to confine Germany and Italy to European soil but there is no need to upset the political system in righting this wrong.

Misery is stealing over Europe, working from east to west. A French observer describes conditions beyond the Rhine and the Danube and offers a remedy.

Central Europe *in* Distress

By MARCEL RAY

Translated from *L'Europe Nouvelle*
Paris Foreign-Affairs Weekly

DURING THE PAST three weeks I have been accompanying M. Loucheur in the rapid but extraordinarily interesting trip that he has been making through Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. M. Loucheur, it should be said, is a former cabinet member and former president of the commission in charge of non-German reparations.

He undertook his last trip as a private citizen and had no mission to fulfill. As president of the French committee of the Pan-European Union he wanted to take part in the splendid manifestations of the Second Pan-European Congress held in Berlin by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder, leader, and tireless worker of the Union and ardent apostle of Continental coöperation. M. Loucheur also wanted to study in the different capitals of the states that have succeeded the Hapsburg monarchy the difficulties that may arise as a result of the agreements recently signed at the Hague and in Paris which have ended the vexing disputes of eastern reparations and which, in a large measure, represented his own personal achievement. And finally, but most important of all, he planned to assemble direct, precise information concerning the economic difficulties and the agricultural crisis that most of these European countries are undergoing and to apply the spirit of M. Briand's memorandum by sounding out the various governments in regard to their attitude on solving specifically European problems in a collective way.

It is not my business to report here what conclusions M. Loucheur may have drawn. I shall only describe conditions and attempt to give an idea of the atmosphere in which I made this trip, confining myself entirely to my own personal impressions. As far as the present position of Germany is concerned, these impressions are not optimistic. As far as the impressions of Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, my views are varied and are colored by the political and economic solidity I found in the various countries. In a general way, I discovered that in all the countries I visited the agricultural crisis has assumed much graver proportions than I had suspected.

THE Pan-European Congress in Berlin opened in an atmosphere that seemed to echo Briand's memorandum. Frau Käte Stresemann appeared at two of the big public meetings. She had on her right the French ambassador and on her left Herr Curtius, the German foreign minister. The opening speech was made in the name of the Government by Dr. Wirth, former Chancellor and Minister of the Interior. The success of these manifestations in favor of international solidarity was striking, as one may judge from the eagerness of the governments, from the quality of the audience, and above all from the acclamations that greeted the three French orators, Loucheur, Joseph Barthélemy, and Serruys. But in the eyes of an observer who was determined to see things as they are it is by no means certain that this enthusiasm aroused beyond the walls of our vast auditorium a repercussion as immediate and as profound as one could have wished.

I did not feel that Dr. Wirth's Pan-European ardor was shared by his fellow Cabinet members, none of whom visited our second meeting. I did not see in the auditorium a single politician of any importance, and even the leaders of the left-wing parties were conspicuous by their absence. The columns of the Berlin press, including the papers of the left, did not overflow with descriptions of our meetings. In short, I received the impression that the directing influences and leaders of German opinion maintained a certain reserve, less on account of the congress than on account of Briand's memorandum. In other words, seven months after the death of Stresemann, his memory is still honored but there seems to be a general desire to throw off his imperious dictates. I should not go so far as to say that the country has turned its back on him, but his thought is being subjected to various interpretations. Fresh nuances are being discovered. His original emphasis is being shifted. People are attaching themselves more to the national than to the international aspects of his policy. It is to the liberator of the Rhineland and not to the negotiator of the Locarno Treaty that a statue is to be raised.

The essence of Stresemann's policy, both foreign and domestic, was compromise, not passive compromise but a process of harmonizing divergent interests with a view to developing a logical course of action, however distant the result of that course might be. Stresemann's successors have unfortunately failed to inherit his authority, his broad views, and above all his indomitable will to subordinate personal interests to national ones. It is remarkable that the Stresemann era, which was preceded by a violent crisis, has been followed by another crisis no less serious. In this new situation the leaders of the country are showing a tendency to yield to whichever party shouts the loudest. At the moment it is the peasants who are suffering, and the agrarians who are shouting, and all the forces of the right have joined them in a chorus of protest. The accession of the Brüning Cabinet, headed by a right-wing Catholic who served as an officer during the War, embodies this shift toward the right.

One result is that the whole Cabinet is perceptibly favoring producers, both industrial and agricultural, rather than consumers. Another result has been that German policy is developing a tendency to abandon arbitration and to take sides, to arraign itself against certain individuals and to support others. This need not end, however, in placing Germany against all the rest of Europe to the certain detriment of both.

Have I exaggerated a reaction, which is hardly discernible as yet? What I have not exaggerated, in any case, is the seriousness of the domestic crisis that has been gathering for months past in the face of a weak government and of a parliament whose traditional parties have broken up in the face of groups of special interests. This crisis, which Dr. Wirth did not hesitate to describe to the Pan-European Congress, can be divided into three parts: deficit, unemployment, and agricultural depression. Yet these are merely three symptoms of the same disease. The deficit exists and increases because the excessive cost of living means that an army of officials has to keep getting more pay. The number of the unemployed, which is more than three million, keeps growing because high taxes are handicapping capitalists whose industries are already overrationalized. Unemployment has also been increased by the agricultural crisis, which has driven peasants to the cities since they are unable to sell farm products at a profit. As for the agricultural crisis, it originated in the immense effort to stimulate artificially the production of grain, an effort that is justified from the point of view of national defense but that is absurd from the European point of view.

I am alluding only briefly to symptoms of an evil whose increasing danger has wiped the smiles off even the most optimistic faces in Germany. As for remedies, I feel that people have searched for them only in the form of expedients or in the much too limited field of purely

German resources. Must the number of unemployed rise to four million and must the agricultural crisis end in a peasant revolt to make German politicians cast their eyes beyond their own frontiers and look at Europe, which wants aid and wants to aid them?

ECONOMIC disorder and agricultural distress prevail in varying degrees in all the countries that I visited after leaving Berlin. It seems that the whole world is suffering paradoxically from too many good harvests and that the peasant is everywhere prevented from making his normal profit from the soil through the very excess of his labors.

In Central and Eastern Europe, as in Germany, close connections exist between politics and economics. In most of these countries, however, this relationship is very different from what I observed in Berlin. The political situation is almost universally excellent and is tending to consolidate itself, but the economic situation is almost universally bad and prevents political development.

In Czechoslovakia the far-sighted, determined policies of President Masaryk and Dr. Beneš have gradually been overcoming obstacles and justifying themselves by results. These policies aim to achieve national union and social peace by quieting political disputes and gaining the support of minorities. My last visit to Prague occurred over two years ago, and I found on my return impressive improvements. The Communist movement and the attempts at Fascist agitation have been virtually eliminated. The symptoms of dissatisfaction in Slovakia have almost vanished. The presence of an agrarian at the head of the Government consolidates the Cabinet and blunts the edge of disputes between industrial and agricultural interests. Agricultural reform has become part and parcel of the nation's life. A brave, tenacious policy of social foresight has created institutions that larger nations may well envy. But the most surprising achievement of all is the successful coöperation between Germans and Slavs. The German minority is well represented in positions of power and has formed the habit of thinking in national terms in its own language. The number of Germans who refuse to become assimilated is constantly declining.

Czechoslovakia would therefore find itself well advanced on the path of progress if it did not have to contend against an economic disease that extends beyond its own frontiers. The number of unemployed is officially a hundred thousand, but I have heard much larger figures quoted unofficially. The evil is not yet very serious but it is growing. The same thing might be said of the agricultural crisis, which is less acute in Czechoslovakia than in the other successor states. Nevertheless, critical symptoms exist, including the sugar crisis, a result of world-wide disorder and of high industrial tariffs.

The farther one advances to the east and south the more simple this struggle toward state consolidation in the face of economic obstacles appears. Indeed, it seems to be a general phenomenon and I must confine myself in the space at my disposal to brief descriptions. In Yugoslavia an exceptional form of government rendered inevitable by the dangers of national dislocation has succeeded in less than two years in overcoming two perils. The recent ministerial changes which gave Cabinet positions to six ministers who are Croats or Slovenes seem to have produced domestic harmony, and the activities of that first-rate diplomat, M. Marinkovitch, guarantee a firm and prudent foreign policy. But one also observes that Yugoslavia has not yet put through its agrarian reform, that it is suffering from a lack of capital and insufficient credit, that its peasants, laborious and sympathetic as they are, are finding it almost as difficult to dispose of their surplus products as they were on the eve of the World War.

A similar situation exists in Rumania, with more clearly marked indications of uncertainty and peril. The Maniu Government has successfully completed its thankless task of financial stabilization. It has fostered closer coöperation between Transylvania and the older Rumanian provinces. It has just settled the dispute with the Hungarian optants. The return of Prince Carol, which appeared imminent when I left Budapest, will perhaps quell the political struggle and encourage national unity. But Rumanian agriculture, in which four-fifths of the population is engaged, has been crushed by too many good harvests, by the overproduction of wheat and corn, by the currency depression, and by the lack of farm credits.

Hungary and Bulgaria are in an exactly similar situation and are also threatened with social dangers. The magnificent, fertile fields of Hungary give every evidence of prosperity, but when one enters the villages one discovers that the granaries are still full of last year's wheat, that enormous piles of newly dug potatoes are rotting in the farmyards or are being exported at a maximum price of three francs per hundred kilogrammes. The peasant contemplates this profusion of food but has no money to buy a shirt or a pair of shoes.

ONE cannot but recognize that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, all of them menaced by the same agrarian peril, are even more incapable than Germany of conjuring away this peril with what means they have at their disposal. All of them are stifled by their high tariffs which, beyond a certain level, crush them rather than protect them. In their present extremity they are appealing—at least most of them are—to foreign aid, but they can only conceive of this aid in the form of financial assistance.

It is at this point that the problem becomes either complicated or completely clear, depending on whether one takes the bad or good side. I am afraid that each interested nation, thinking only of itself, has up to now consistently put the cart before the horse. The great western countries, and France above all, have the most obvious reasons for not wanting economic and social disorder to increase in Central Europe, since we shall ourselves suffer from its contagion and its consequences. We western countries, aside from all considerations of duty and friendship, have every interest not to refuse our aid to those younger nations whose frontiers we recently fixed and who, on the whole, have made the most meritorious efforts to justify the confidence that we accorded them. But, on the other hand, the great nations, too, have their difficulties and there is no doubt that they will not lend their resources to any country that will not provide certain guarantees of security, in every sense of the word. The best of these guarantees is to begin some economic organization, first of all within each individual country and later between regional groups, which would be the embryo of that united Europe which M. Briand wants to build.

But we must not make our plans too vast or dream of reconstituting, under better political conditions, the economic group included in the old Danube monarchy. The urgent problems that present themselves to-day demand more modest and limited solutions. The question of excess grain production and the question of farm credits could be solved by central organizations governing a whole group of countries. I am only indicating the direction that a first attempt at Continental reorganization might take and I may add that I found in the various capitals of Central Europe, even in Budapest and Vienna, minds that were open to solutions of this nature. The terrific pressure of the agricultural crisis and the dumb, universal discontent have removed most of the traditional objections that might be made to such a policy.

But something even stronger than these objections must be overcome, and that is the temptation to do evil. Europe cannot long remain in the state of distress and instability that now exists. I remember the fears that I felt it necessary to express on the subject of Germany. If the Continent does not begin to organize itself, it runs the risk of falling into hostile blocs, of returning to the conditions of 1913 and 1914. More need not be said. We are entering a period in which the fate of our continent may hang in the balance. Anyone who uses his own eyes and casts aside preconceived ideas, who travels through Europe eastward from the Rhine and the Alps, will return convinced, I am sure, that we must at once erect dams and dikes against a danger of which the agricultural crisis is merely an urgent warning.

Provincial autonomy subject to British central control is the essence of the Simon Commission's Report on India. Here are three different viewpoints—Conservative, Independent, and Laborite.

Simon *and* INDIA

By THREE BRITISH
EDITORS

I. THE NEW WAY IN INDIA

From the *Times*, London Conservative Daily

WITH THE PUBLICATION of the second part of their Report, the work of the Indian Statutory Commission comes to an end. If their recommendations are followed, there will be an end also to the method of procedure which brought them into existence. The first principle which the Commissioners lay down in their constructive volume—and it dominates all that follows—is that any form of constitution devised to-day must, so far as possible, contain within itself the seeds of its own future growth. They are profoundly convinced that the prospect of periodical investigations has had a disastrous effect on the working of the constitutional changes introduced ten years ago. Some politicians declined from the outset to take any part whatever in reforms which were avowedly temporary; some used them merely to gain advantage of position; every rivalry of race and religion was intensified, and the whole course of politics was distorted, by tactical preparation for a date of revision inexorably fixed beforehand and at the best far too soon for any real test of progress.

From whatever motive it may proceed there will probably be general agreement on this primary conclusion which Sir John Simon and his colleagues draw from their experience. In the light of their emphatic opinion no one is likely hereafter to maintain a programme of autonomy by installments—in the sense of a series of disturbing jerks—as against

their own belief in steady progress by natural evolution. It is safe to say that there will never again be a 'Simon Commission,' and that the delicate plant of self-government will be allowed in future to prove itself by its fruits, and to develop according to its capacity from the various soils of India, without being dug up at regular intervals for a standardized inspection. Here at least is common ground on which British trusteeship and Indian nationalism should be willing to meet.

That, however, is by no means to suggest that the present inquiry was justified only by the fact that the British Government were publicly pledged to it. As matters were left in 1919—with a number of essential questions either ignored altogether in the tumult of enthusiastic settlements which followed the War or deliberately shelved for future consideration—it was clearly necessary, the sooner the better, to give a new direction and a wider outlook to 'the progressive realization of responsible government' in India. The Statutory Commissioners do this by grouping their recommendations round four fundamental principles. Their first is to be found in the axiom, already noted, that their scheme must be susceptible of development to the fullest extent by the progress of Indians themselves. Their second is that Indians in this connection must be taken as meaning the peoples of all India—that is to say, of the States, which occupy one-third of the whole, as well as of British India. Their third follows naturally from the second and holds that so complete a solution of the Indian problem—embracing the States as well as the provinces, and infinite variety in both—is only to be found in that form of constitution which is called federation. Their fourth is that the circumstances of India demand full provision during the transitional period for the maintenance of orderly government against dangers without and within.

All these four principles might have been deduced without much difficulty from the plain statement of facts of which the first volume of the Report consisted. They might even have been deduced, for that matter, from the account of the contemporary situation on which the present constitution was based a dozen years ago. Mr. Montagu's successors give full value to such hints and phrases—for example, 'the eventual future of India is a sisterhood of states,' 'a congeries of self-governing Indian provinces . . . with possibly what are now the Native States of India finally embodied in the same whole,' and so on—as they are able to find in the proposals which he and Lord Chelmsford put forward at that time. They are careful to refrain from criticism of earlier workers in this stubborn field. Their own ideas at bottom are the same; their 'governing purpose' is to carry out the declaration of 1917; there is no divergence whatever about the goal staked out by a British Parliament and steadily kept in view by British policy. But it is impossible

not to recognize that the Statutory Commission have in truth set a new course toward the goal by translating mere ideas into a definite scheme of federal union—just as it is impossible not to rejoice that these ideas, which many of us have long cherished, should at last have been confirmed by so much expert research and analysis.

FROM the main belief in federation as the true means of expressing essential unity certain important conclusions follow. There is no longer any reason, for instance, why states and provinces, both categories illustrating every stage of political progress, should all be expected to fit a common mould. Colonel Wedgwood spoke sound sense on that subject in the last Indian debate in the House of Commons. The elasticity of a federal constitution is held with good reason to be one of its chief advantages for the manifold peoples of India. There is every reason, on the other hand, in so vast a country, to abandon the farce of direct election to a remote central Parliament at Delhi, and to assign to the provinces far greater importance as the effective centres of administration.

The Commission point out that 'there is a very definite correspondence between dimensions of area and population and the kind of constitution that can be operated successfully. . . . If self-government is to be a reality it must be applied to political units of a suitable size.' And, since they are determined to give reality to self-government, it follows further that the new importance of the provinces demands the abandonment of diarchy with its 'blurred responsibility.' That device disappears under their scheme, and each province becomes, so far as possible, 'mistress in her own house.' It need hardly be added that diarchy is condemned *a fortiori* for the Central Executive, where 'unity must be preserved at all costs' and the importance of the Viceroy's functions will not be diminished. Finally, since the need for a central legislature remains, the method of federalism will enable India to meet it—as the United States and most of the British dominions have met it in the past—by the coöperation of a number of autonomous units, grown to political self-consciousness through responsibility for their own affairs and able to determine for themselves the ultimate form of the common structure. Such, in the briefest summary, is the new way proposed for the 'progressive realization of responsible government.' It may not appeal to politicians whose vision is obsessed by the Westminster model. But it seems on the face of it more practicable, better calculated in the end to be expeditious, incomparably wider in outlook, and closer akin to that pattern—it should more accurately be called a process—which is associated with the idea of a dominion.

It has become the fashion during the last week or two to speak of this second volume of the Report as more important than the first. So

in a sense it is, but it is largely the importance which comes of curiosity; for the constructive proposals, though they form a remarkably coherent whole, are admittedly more tentative, and more susceptible to the influence of public opinion, than the hard facts of the situation which were set out as their basis in Volume I. It is still conceivable that these proposals may be profoundly modified hereafter as they pass through the mesh of all the refining and critical procedure—the Conference, the Joint Committee, the Parliamentary debates—which is to be interposed before there is any question of legislation.

There is the greater leisure, therefore, in which to consider the extraordinarily detailed and thorough constitutional scheme which is presented to us as the logical outcome of the facts. Such features of it, to name no others, as the case for transferring the responsibility for every sphere of government (including even the Department of Law and Order) to the provincial ministers; the reluctant but definite conviction that communal representation must continue; the machinery suggested for indirect election to a central legislature and for the gradual accession of the States to a Council for Greater India; the separate report on Indian finance, offering larger resources to the provinces, for which the Commission are indebted to Sir Walter Layton; the special provision for the removal of the great obstacles presented by the problems of defense, for the maintenance of the public services, the centralization of the High Courts, and the separate treatment of Burma and of the Northwest Frontier Province—all these are matters of the deepest and most controversial interest, which will require separate attention as time goes on. Their treatment in the Report is certainly not to be dismissed with the parrot cry that they are ‘an insult to India,’ for there is not a word in it from first to last which is not inspired by the most obvious sympathy with the Indian national movement.

In the case of a document which is open for everyone to read, public criticism of it becomes a peculiarly glaring test of the political competence of the critics. Moreover, the Report retains to the end the unanimous adherence of seven impartial Commissioners of widely different political antecedents—for such rare individual incursions as Major Attlee’s ingenious plan of ‘primaries’ for the protection of minorities and Lord Burnham’s useful note on publicity merely emphasize an astounding agreement on fundamental principles—and it retains also that freedom from meaningless generalities which proves that unanimity was not bought by weak concessions. The broad impression which it leaves is that the conclusions do fit the facts with unanswerable logic, and that the result is a scheme of self-government, fitted to the special conditions of the case and unlimited except by safeguards against its own collapse, which marks the most hopeful advance of our generation toward the solution of the problem of India.

II. THE SIMON PROPOSALS

From the *New Statesman*, London Independent Weekly

THE FIRST VOLUME of the Simon Report had prepared us for a programme of reforms in India covering a wide field and worked out with infinite care. That we have undoubtedly got in the second volume which has appeared this week. But those who read between the lines of Part I were prepared also for caution in the proposals of Part II. And caution there is. The Simon constitution makes no pretense of offering anything that could be called dominion status. It is a nicely balanced compromise between democracy and autocracy, in which autocracy predominates. It will, of course, be rejected with contempt and fury by the whole left wing of nationalism. But it will also be found unacceptable, we may be sure, to the great body of moderate and liberal opinion in India, on whose conciliation and coöperation we must depend for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

The Commission start out with two sound principles. The first is that the new constitution must not be framed on rigid lines. It must be flexible, allowing for natural growth and diversity, 'containing within itself provision for its own development,' and the stages of that development must not be prescribed in a fixed time-table. The second principle is that the basis of the constitution must be federal. India is not one but many, and ultimate unity must be achieved through a federation in which the provinces of British India and the autonomous Indian States can maintain each its own separate interests while collaborating in those that are common to all. The Indian States cannot, of course, be hustled holus-bolus into such a scheme; their entry would, it is conceived, be voluntary and it would be gradual—though gradualness need not mean an inordinately long delay. For the moment the Commissioners suggest the creation of a 'Council for Greater India,' composed of thirty members of whom ten would be representatives of the States, to consult on matters of common concern. This, it is hoped, would make a beginning in the process which would presently lead to an all-India federation.

But the question of immediate urgency is, of course, that of British India. The reforms proposed for the provinces are substantial. The franchise is to be extended, so that the electorate will be treble its present number, and will include twenty per cent of the adult population. The membership of the Councils is to be enlarged to 200 or 250, and their life is to be five years. Whether there should be second chambers is a moot point. Communal representation, regrettable as it may be, must continue for the present, until Hindus and Mohammedans can learn to bury the hatchet. But more important than all this is the proposal to abolish diarchy and establish responsible government in each of the

provinces. (An exception is made in the case of Burma, which the Commission rightly decide should be separated from India. The Burmese constitution is left for further discussion, but it appears that some modified form of crown colony government is contemplated. A constitutional advance is also proposed for the Northwest Frontier Province, but this would stop a good way short of responsible government.) The more timorous critics are already shaking their heads over the prospect of transferring 'Law and Order'—that is to say, the control of the police—to Indian ministers. But as Sir John Simon and his colleagues argue, to withhold this would make it mere humbug to pretend that diarchy was abolished. Moreover, the provincial governor will retain in his own hands very considerable safeguards against trouble. He will be able, in fact, in any emergency to override his ministers if he judges it necessary for the 'safety and tranquillity of the province.' This power, we should think, is ample, and a great many Indians will consider it too ample. It was, however, approved in the Report of the Indian Central Committee, consisting of Sir Sankaran Nair and the other representative men who were appointed by the Council of State in 1928 to draw up their own scheme independently of the Simon Commission.

SO FAR, so good. There is undeniably a big advance of self-government in the proposals for the provinces, where, again undeniably, Indian statesmen and administrators must, in any scheme, find their most important work. But the problem of the centre is dealt with in a very different way. Certain changes are recommended, notably an enlargement of the Legislative Assembly (in future to be called the Federal Assembly) from 145 to between 250 and 180, and a method of indirect election by the Provincial Councils. Both these proposals are good. But what of the momentous question of powers? Here, save in one comparatively small matter, there is to be no change. Sir Walter Layton, in his very able report on Indian finances (which is embodied in the main Report of the Commission), argues for the raising centrally of additional revenues and their allocation to the provinces. The Commission lay it down that the Federal Assembly shall have the function of imposing the necessary taxes and collecting them on behalf of the provinces, and that in this matter it shall enjoy a certain freedom from interference—that is to say, in the event of the Federal Assembly's rejecting any such project of taxation, the governor general should have no right to overrule its rejection. But this is clearly a bagatelle. For the rest things are to remain as they are. In a word, there is to be no responsible government at Delhi. Here is the fundamental weakness that vitiates the whole elaborately drawn scheme.

Why have the Commission shown this extreme caution? Their argu-

ment on the point is singularly unenlightening. They begin with an emphatic statement that 'diarchy at the centre, or any system of divided responsibility resembling diarchy, is quite impossible.' They go on to recapitulate the defects of diarchy in the provinces, and declare that it would be an astonishing policy to abandon it there and introduce it at the centre. As to that, we should say that it might be astonishing and yet in all the circumstances expedient. Why should a paradox wreck a constitution? And we frankly do not understand why a diarchy in the Central Executive would 'not only weaken the Government, but would put the Viceroy in a situation so embarrassing as to be almost intolerable.' He might, we are told, 'constantly find that he had to choose between two sets of advisers all of whom were his colleagues, and that while the ultimate policy to be announced was in accordance with his judgment, the constitution permitted some members of his own Government to dissociate themselves from his decision.' This impossibility of dividing responsibility, these embarrassments of the Viceroy, seem to us to be chimeras of the imagination—or else pretexts to cover a profound distrust of Indian aspirations and Indian capacities.

Nobody, of course, expected the grant of dominion status; that under present conditions would clearly be an impossibility. But a measure of responsible government, with certain definite limitations, is another matter. If any Indians chose to think of it as 'dominion status with reservations,' there would surely be no harm, provided the reservations were adequate. Are not the reservations accepted by Sir Sankaran Nair and his colleagues on the Indian Central Committee adequate? They agree that the army, and relations with foreign powers and Indian States, should be entirely in the hands of the Viceroy, and further that the legislature should not be competent, without his express sanction, to deal with any measures affecting the public debt or revenue, or the religious rights or usages of any class of British subjects in India, or to interfere with the provincial governments, or to repeal or amend any act or ordinance of the governor general. The field in which responsible government would be exercised, therefore, would comprise customs and taxation, communications, justice, commerce and labor, irrigation, and various minor subjects. We do not foresee any serious danger in such a division, and we believe with the Indian Central Committee that it 'could be worked with reasonable success, given a certain amount of good will on both sides.' No doubt it would be a *pis aller*, but that in the present state of India any constitution is bound to be.

WE HAVE no desire to exaggerate the gravity of the situation. But it is madness to make light of it. Nationalism in India to-day is a powerful force, as it is elsewhere, and it may become to-morrow an exceed-

ingly dangerous force, as it has elsewhere. We may disregard, or suppress, its more violent manifestations; but we certainly cannot afford to do that unless we are prepared to make generous concessions to its more moderate claims. That of course the Simon Commission, like all sensible men, can see and admit. What they do not appear to see is the difference between generosity in British eyes and in Indian eyes. The vast majority of articulate opinion in India demands a measure of responsible government at the centre, and will not be satisfied with less. To concede that may involve taking risks. Risks of what? Of mistakes due to inexperience—yes; of inefficient administration at this point or that—yes. But not, we believe, while the safeguards that must be maintained are maintained, of mistakes that cannot be rectified, of violent conflict or the breakdown of the machinery of government. These indeed are precisely the risks that will attach to timidity or niggardliness on our part.

The choice before us then, as we see it, is this. Either we must propound a new constitution which the reasonable elements in the body of Indian nationalism will accept, or we must prepare to control the country in the teeth of active as well as passive opposition. Sooner or later this will lead to the breakdown of peaceful government and the rule of the sword. Who can contemplate that with equanimity? And which of us, Britain or Indian, would have to give way in the end? But if it is to be the other choice, then the facts—including psychological facts—must be faced, and no stone must be left unturned to make the Round-Table Conference a reality. That means a conference in which the report of the Simon Commission will indeed be treated with all the respect that it deserves, but will not be put on the table as our last word to India.

III. THE SIMON COMMISSION FAILS

From the Daily Herald, London Labor Daily

IF THE PURPOSE of the Simon Commissioners was to devise ways and means of improving the Indian Constitution while retaining the present régime in all essentials, then they have succeeded. But this is scarcely the problem which confronts the two countries to-day. The British nation is pledged to the establishment of dominion status for India. Honor and wisdom alike demand that the pledge should be fulfilled; and on this point the Commissioners are rightly agreed. The problem is to provide ways and means of passing through the inevitable period of the transition.

Here the Commission is not overhelpful. Its proposals, so far from preparing the way to a rapid transformation, seem to us to tend rather to the indefinite stabilizing, on essential points, of the final authority

and power in the present system. Real power is, under the Report's proposal, retained in the hands of the Viceroy or the governors.

The Government of India, in short, remains responsible only to the Viceroy. He can, if he so wishes, veto all acts of the legislature. He can himself legislate without its consent. He can sanction expenditure and even impose taxation. Even in the provinces, where the Report envisages more rapid progress toward autonomous government, the rights and powers of the elected assemblies are subject to the overriding authority of the governors.

This is not self-government, nor is there, as one had hoped, even the provision of means by which the present order may be gradually but definitely transformed. The proposals concerning the powers of the Viceroy and the governors—the core of the problem—are a negation of the machinery of self-government which, elsewhere, the Commissioners advocate.

Here is the fatal weakness of the Report: fatal not only to all hope of its acceptance even by moderate Indian opinion, but fatal to all value in the present situation. It has evaded the main problem.

And yet the work of the Commission has not been wasted. For many of its judgments are surely right. It seems to us emphatically right in concluding that the ultimate form of Indian Government must be federal. It is right in emphasizing—though it tends to overemphasize—the necessity of bringing the Indian States into the future federation. It is probably right in proposing the immediate separation of Burma. In very many details there arise suggestions which the most nationalist of Indians would be foolish to ignore.

All this is unfortunately vitiated by the central weakness—the failure to face the central problem boldly and generously. From start to finish the Report suffers from a lack of imaginative policy. 'A thousand and one reasons,' wrote the Prime Minister in the *Daily Herald* in 1927, 'are given for just a little more tutelage.' That was a prophetic summary of this Report.

Mr. MacDonald's remedy still, we feel sure, remains the same—'plain, practical commonsense.' 'India must be in the Empire on equal terms. The time has come for us to take that step.'

Along that courageous line, not among the hesitations of the Simon Report, the two countries will find the solution of the problems that face them. If the Round-Table Conference, to which we still hope that Gandhi and his colleagues will come, can freely discuss the way of attaining dominion status in the light of the Commission's Report and of Indian opinion, peace and friendship may yet be attained.

Does modern education glorify war?
Five hundred French school children
were shown authentic motion pictures
of the Battle of Verdun and then asked
to express their opinions. Here they are.

Children *and* War Films

By CÉSAR SANTELLI

Translated from the *Mercure de France*
Paris Literary and Political Semimonthly

WHAT IMPRESSION do war films make upon children and adolescents? How does war, which they have known only through books and oral tradition, appear to them when they see it depicted on the screen? What effect do war scenes have on the childish mind? Light has been thrown on these difficult questions by an experiment based on the showing of *Verdun, visions d'histoire*, a war film generally considered a model of its kind, to several hundred school children. The children, who ranged from seven to nineteen years of age, came from lower and upper primary schools, *écoles normales*, and secondary schools.

The experiment was conducted under as natural conditions as possible, and of the five hundred papers received, almost all seemed spontaneous and personal. It was not a class assignment. The day after the performance the pupils were simply asked quite unexpectedly, 'What are your impressions?' and then given time to write a few lines. It should also be noted that almost all the students witnessed the film voluntarily, no pressure having been exerted. Furthermore, their behavior while watching it left no doubt but that it interested them intensely, though the older ones reacted differently from the younger, and the boys differently from the girls. The latter, more reserved than the former, did not often show their emotions, while the boys expressed themselves openly, sometimes noisily, but never inappropriately. A few brief explosions of chauvinism occurred, but they were not contagious

and found no echo. Long applause greeted the appearances of Foch, Pétain, Clemenceau, or Driant on the screen, but the enemy never met with any hostile manifestation, even when its rôle recalled that of a stage villain. It should be added, however, that some of the children could not always tell Germans and French apart, and the enemy may have received the benefit of the doubt on some occasions.

Silences also occurred more eloquent than noisy demonstrations, particularly when the chaplain gave the last rites to the dying on the field of battle, and during the scenes of civilian distress. The sorrowful lines of refugees and the evacuation of family estates—such incidents produced a severe emotional strain. And, at the end, when, as a symbol of the return of peace, scarred, naked trees give way to apple blossoms, there was embarrassed silence, as the audience wondered whether or not to applaud.

DID the film give an idea of what war is like? Yes, to almost everyone. *Verdun, visions d'histoire* is considered to possess a documentary value lacking in such a film as *The Big Parade*. To most of the children it presented a true revelation of war, a subject on which their previous notions were mild or inaccurate—which goes to show that oral or written accounts, photographs, and even visits to battlefields cannot accomplish what a film can. Phrases such as these occurred often:—

‘Not till last night did I have any notion of what war is like.’—‘I never realized war is so terrible before seeing this film.’—‘I had only a vague idea of war; now I know what it is.’—‘I had some idea of what war would be like, but the various scenes definitely fixed in my mind the idea of horror.’—‘Without that presentation, I could never have imagined such a hideous massacre.’

Some recognized clearly that they had imagined war as being a matter of military parades, with more plumes than danger:—

‘At first I thought war consisted of bugles and drums, but I see that it does not’ (12 years).—‘In going to see the film, I was delighted that I was going to see war, but on coming out I no longer felt the same’ (13 years).

Most of them felt that the film was ‘glaring truth’ and that it had completely revolutionized their conception of war. But what ideas did they gain from it? Just what does war mean to them? Some of the little primary school boys found war fine, others found it sad, but they liked least the parts in which the French were being beaten. They never used the words ‘horrible, frightful’ which appeared in the answers of practically all the older pupils. The little girls shared these mild views, but were chiefly impressed by war’s ugliness: ‘War is not pretty to see, either in real life or on the screen’ (8 years). Like many of the boys, they im-

puted the ugliness not to war itself, but to the Germans, who, according to one little girl, 'make trouble just so people will suffer' (7 years). Neither the little girls nor boys were particularly concerned with mortal peril, wounds, or pain, but they were deeply troubled by what may be called the 'uncomfortable' aspect of war. Many replies contained observations of this sort:—

'They [the soldiers] were dirty and slept on top of each other' (9 years).—'The soldiers were not neat. They did not shave often.'

It should be noted that the younger children generally expressed their feelings in a frank, straightforward manner, particularly the little girls, whereas the older ones were more thoughtful and reserved. Most of the girls of ten or under found the film disagreeable and even fatiguing. Many of their replies contained such phrases as these:—

'It is not any fun.'—'I didn't like it.'—'I don't like to see people fighting.'

Some suffered physically:—

'It gave me a headache.'—'It made my head feel badly.'—'I cried and I didn't like it.'

A nine-year-old Tunisian boy told shyly, but with touching sincerity, how upset he felt:—

'I was ready to cry when I went into the theatre. When the piece started I said nothing, my comrades all told me that I said nothing. When the intermission came I was hot and felt badly and wanted to go, but they kept me, though I felt badly. Then when we came out they started to tell stories about Verdun. But while they talked I wanted to cry at seeing the machine guns roar. I went home all sad at what I had seen.'

But this malaise was rare among the younger children, as was also a sense of pity. Some of the little boys showed a distressing lack of comprehension. A lad of ten wrote coldly:—

'The peasant saying good-bye to his family did not affect us much. [He speaks of an evacuation scene which roused the deepest emotions of the older students.] On the other hand, the disorder in the house after the bomb fell nearly made us laugh.'

A twelve-year-old boy shared the same serenity:—

'I felt great pleasure at seeing such a lovely film; everything was nice, especially the capture of Fort Douaumont. I think that, if they played this film again, I should return with pleasure.'

A boy of eleven, on the other hand, found that 'war is no fun; you risk being killed and you can't even sleep.' Most of these boys used the words 'frightful, terrible, hideous' several times. Many wept, but they did not tell their friends about it. Those who did were subjected to ridicule, as this note by a boy of eleven testifies:—

'Seeing a dead soldier with the chaplain praying over him made me

cry, but when I got back to school and told my comrades they made fun of me.'

The older students were all left with a feeling of horror, perhaps mixed with admiration or a certain inward satisfaction at witnessing the heroism of their compatriots. The girls were more sensitive than the boys, and expressed pride less often. Many were impressed with the discomforts of war compared to the comforts of peace. Remarks of this kind occurred frequently:—

'I realize now how sweet is the tranquil life of to-day' (15 years).—
'Seeing this film makes us understand how happy we should be in times of peace.'—'This film shows me how happy I should be when I think of the moral and physical suffering endured by the soldiers during the War.'

Some received lessons in patience or even an invitation to be hard:—

'Seeing this film makes me scoff at my unhappy air when I pity myself because of a scratch.'

Others, too upset, declared emphatically:—

'I shall never go to see such a film again' (14 years).

CERTAINLY war as portrayed in the film did not appear pleasant; the experiment shows that clearly. It is equally clear that the almost unanimous impression of horror increased with the age of the students and was felt more keenly by the older girls than by the older boys. But one must not rashly conclude that this impression automatically produced humane and pacific sentiments. Though many left the theatre with a deep hatred of war, this hatred was neither of a general nature nor was it always directed against war itself. Some, by temperament or education, hated the enemy more than war, which they entirely disliked only when the other side was winning.

The youngest children, the eight- and nine-year-olds, did not even notice the film's attempt at impartiality (which, by the way, was not wholly successful), and the little boys were as bellicose on leaving the theatre as they had been before. Their natural hatred of the enemy was intensified:—

'The film made me feel a kind of rage against the Germans' (10 years).—'I was displeased to see the Germans attacking the forts, and happy to see them repulsed.'

There were some cries of victory:—

'Long live France and its tricolor!'—'I was proud to cry: "Long live France!"'—'We repulsed the Germans. France's victory was Germany's just punishment.'

There were nevertheless conclusions adverse to war:—

'War is a disaster.'—'It is an abominable crime; I hope there will

be no more war.'—'I shall never like war because it causes too much sorrow.'

The little girls showed more patriotic feeling than the little boys. Many replies judged the Germans harshly and at the same time praised the French:—

'The Boches are very wicked.'—'I don't like the Boches.'—'The Germans are not good for us.'—'I don't like the Germans.'—'The Germans are very bad men.'

Then there was this curious note:—

'The French have kind hearts; they do not like the Germans, who bombard all countries but Germany.'

The children of eleven and twelve had more varied, precise ideas of war, and chauvinism was exceptional among them. They admired the courage and good fellowship of the soldiers, but the horror of war was the dominant impression. A twelve-year-old boy was hurt by the chauvinism of his neighbors at the performance (doubtless the youngest children mentioned above), and wrote these melancholy lines:—

'It made me sad that each time a German soldier killed a Frenchman nothing was said, whereas if a Frenchman chanced to kill a German I would hear in back of me the words, "Well done." Yet the German soldier who left his family to defend his country had the same desire as the good Frenchman—to live with his family again some day.'

Some would like to fight in spite of it all:—

'I would like to make war, too, even if I am little' (11 years).

But such remarks were exceptions. Most of the older students sincerely desired peace, through pity, fear, horror of useless destruction, or 'because heroism does no good'; 'courage no longer exists when one considers that one poor, weak little man with a machine gun can kill hundreds of men.'

Some asked 'why people fight,' and found no satisfactory answer, since 'war is of no use.' A sixth-grade pupil asked: 'Why build such lovely cities only to destroy them afterward?' 'War,' wrote another, 'is something I can't see any sense to' (11 years). Another said bluntly, 'War is stupid.'

War is 'something they don't want to see when they are grown up.' Notwithstanding, most of them would not refuse *a priori* to fight:—

'I would have done the same thing as these soldiers, knowing that I might die and never see my family again' (9 years).—'I have promised myself to defend my country also, and if I am killed it won't make any difference.'

But he spoke without any great enthusiasm and more through reason than feeling. Another young boy said: 'When I have grown up, I shall fight without hatred.' And a ten-year-old wrote: 'It would be a heavy load on my conscience if I killed even one of my enemies.'

It should be noted that the pupils of eleven and twelve or older were struck by the horror of war without regard to nationality. For one who cried, 'It is the Germans who are cruel,' there were ten who made no distinction between the combatants:—

'I can't say who was right or wrong because I don't know anything about it, but no matter what country they came from, the soldiers were all extremely brave. They fought to defend their country, Germans against French.'—'The French were brave and the Germans, too.'—'They were all heroic, Frenchmen and Germans.'

This European or humane attitude was the *leitmotiv* of the answers of those from 15 to 19 years of age, but especially of the girls. The boys of 13 to 15 still showed some partiality and chauvinism:—

'The film showed us the courage of the French and the cowardice of the Germans.'—'I think Germans are barbarians' (13 years).—'Only the French could have accomplished that, and no others' (14 years).

Remarks of this kind tended to disappear among the older pupils. They generally considered war an atrocious thing which they hoped would disappear from the surface of the earth, but which they would undergo if necessary: 'I detest war, but I am ready to defend my country.'—'We must hope never to see war again, but if it comes we must follow this example.' One declared plainly: 'The film, while it shows us all the atrocities of war, also shows us that we needn't be afraid to die for our country.'

A large number felt that war doesn't pay and that it inflicts incalculable damage:—

'The victorious country suffers just as much as the vanquished.'—'What might not such heroism have accomplished if better employed!'

WHAT conclusions, if any, are to be drawn? Or would it not be better to let each read his own lesson from this material? I shall content myself by noting down certain results which seem to be definitely established.

1. It is always unwise to show war films to very young children, even when such films are perfectly impartial. There is too much danger of awaking dormant warlike propensities.

2. A well planned war film can, since it deals with events to which action is essential, enlighten the youthful imagination as to the realities of war far better than books or oral accounts or even direct contemplation of silent, deserted battlefields.

3. The young people who saw *Verdun, visions d'histoire* took away with them, for the most part, an impression of the horror of war. They considered it a crime against humanity. Not one of them desired it for its own sake, though they did not all dread it absolutely and irrevocably.

4. War, when it is presented as accurately, and therefore as fright-

fully, as possible, incontestably evokes keener and more profound reactions in young people than representations of peace. The emotions that it inspires, whether of admiration, pity, hate, disgust, or pride, are always of greater intensity than those produced by peaceful life. Peace is the daughter of reason, and those who invoke it do so without much enthusiasm. There is no question but that people feel deeply about war, even when they hope it will not return. They do not feel deeply about peace, even when they hope it will last forever.

We doubtless feel this way because we do not perceive that peace also has its heroes. And even those who can conceive of a peace-time heroism implicitly deny it the virtues and grandeur of the heroism of war. To me this is the saddest and most disturbing symptom of all.

Europe may lag behind America in matters of technique, but in the ancient art of love we still have much to learn. A German with first-hand knowledge of his field talks to us like a Dutch uncle.

LOVE in America

By RICHARD HÜLSENBECK

Translated from *Die Literarische Welt*
Berlin Literary Weekly

WHAT DISTINGUISHES the attitude of the average American toward women is his lack of moderation. It is an attitude of either immoderate worship or immoderate contempt. Since the American is very clever at displaying his best qualities to the world, most of us Europeans are only familiar with the attitude of immoderate worship. That is why so many German visitors, impelled by a three days' visit to America to write a book on the subject, describe to us the divine position that the American woman occupies.

The average American's attitude toward love is not based on those sound naturalistic and animalistic foundations which engender a condition of spiritual and physical community. Exceptions, of course, occur, but the outwardly serene appearance of married couples often conceals deficiencies, especially since Americans pay so much attention to appearances. The American wants to possess in love as well as in life. His erotic career avoids everything spiritual, tense, or dramatic. The American merchant has a very special idea of love. He has an ideology of his own based on economics and best explained in economic terms. The task of the American man is to possess a wife. He must have one just as he must have a bank account. The American woman, who is superior to the man in all animal respects, has met this crazy theory more than halfway and makes things as economically difficult for the man as possible. Disdaining all romantic appeals, she demands of her suitor as many tasks and sacrifices as she can get him to perform. If he observes the roughrider school of premarital love peculiar to his country, the woman bleeds him white, but he grits his teeth, for he is determined to conquer her. The man knows that during this love game the woman always holds the whip hand, but the rules compel him to strike the attitude of a toreador. He runs up debts, boastfully invites her on automobile rides, and plays the part of a great spender, although in reality he may be a clerk, earning, perhaps, fifty dollars a week. When the woman decides to marry him and thinks this gruesome game has gone far enough, she lets herself be subjugated. But as soon as the bonds of matrimony are sealed the rules demand that the two players change rôles. The wild conqueror becomes the tame husband. The poor little creature that he subdued suddenly expands and becomes a mighty queen. American marriage laws give the woman a thousand opportunities to keep her husband up to scratch, and since many American women are really much better educated and more intelligent than their husbands, their marriages look like very orderly affairs indeed.

BUT no spiritual communion exists between husband and wife, which explains why the idea of comradeship originated in America. Furthermore, since an attitude of respect in either business or married life is considered a relic of antiquated romanticism and since the American is the kind of person who rushes to one extremity or another, American marriage has become a battlefield where the most modern weapons are employed. The husband believes he has been cheated out of everything that might be called love. He feels that his dignity has been wounded. Yet the woman works hard to maintain her dominant position. She looks with a jealous eye upon any attempt on the part of her husband to improve his education and does all that she can to keep him on the

low level of a mere dollar chaser. It is for this reason that she encourages every trait that brings out her husband's most childish instincts.

The husband hates this wife of his whom the law and the conventions of love maintain in her superior position. He desires her physically but must suppress all signs of excessive passion because it is not socially correct to show one's feelings. The American woman has created what might be called a code of good manners or a kind of cavalier tradition. These good manners determine the attitude of the man and his wife in accordance with the general erotic code and they breathe the atmosphere of a five-o'clock tea party. But behind these manners stands the so-called Puritan tradition, which falls into two classic divisions: the man makes the money, the woman does the honors. Literary snobs who hope to earn handsome royalties writing about marriage have turned out enormous books on the American family, singing the praises of the women's clubs, which are nothing but megaphones of reactionary opinion. The movies and newspapers must express similar views and the old-fashioned American cowboy film taught but one lesson: marriage represents restraint laid upon a wild, money-making vagabond.

The organization of love does not give the man any practical outlet for his hatred, scorn, or sensuality. American girls are constantly eloping with men who pose as their lords and masters, but all too soon the conquering hero finds himself a hopeless victim of the established order. All that is left to him is erotic fancy.

There are times in America when this erotic fancy is so throttled that the man's suppressed nature must break forth. In such cases whole packs of clergymen of every denomination, joined by a chorus of women's clubs, break out into loud howls of protest. They are responsible for the struggle being waged against art, the attacks on Mencken and on all forms of free masculine activity, and the tremendous opposition against everything that might be called personal. But the true masculine nature will not let itself be slain. When a man of genius is trapped into an American marriage, a tragedy ensues whose course the whole country follows with a feverish interest, since it sees its own destiny being displayed.

Take the case of Charlie Chaplin. A genius like Chaplin, endowed with more than the average sentimentality, a man out of the ordinary, needed a wife who understood the essentially animal aspects of love. But luck gave him a gold-digger who took advantage of the law to secure for herself a handsome sum of money. Chaplin had to pay his wife a million dollars because the whole country took the side of good manners. Puritanism, the women's clubs, and the literary advocates have no word for genius in their vocabulary. They look upon Chaplin as a clown who must submit to the customary regulations in regard to love, perhaps even more than most people, since he came to America

from a foreign country. He was cruelly attacked not only to gratify the movie audiences but also because he had wished to be a personality apart from his wife. Such things are not allowed in America. The laws of love do not permit a married man to become a personality.

INDUSTRY encourages these erotic regulations because women are its chief consumers. Ford takes an exceptional interest in making sure that all his workers are regarded by their wives as sober money-makers. The dominant position of women is due to the fact that through them men are kept working. What would the American department stores do if no women came swarming through their doors? All advertisements, all magazines, all sermons, whether delivered on the screen or in the pulpit, are directed at women. Their desire to buy must be cultivated. When an American speaks of a charming relationship between a mother and her child he is thinking of all the laundry that has to be done for the baby. If a man mentions 'home, sweet home,' it is because of the advertisements of some company that sells household goods to the womenfolk.

But as a result of the War the young men of America have undergone a revolution in their attitude toward love. They wish to have nothing more to do with the old system, for as soldiers they got a breath of real love from their French girls. They have gone home and are spreading the notion that marriage means something more than an old-fashioned roughrider ideology with subsequent deceptions. On the contrary, it is something truly sweet that flows from heart to heart. In Europe men call this thing love and even write poems about it.

But let me say here that I believe that the struggle to Europeanize America is a hopeless one. Mass production, the development of trusts, and standardization will provide tremendous moral support for the present code of good manners. Ford's idea that each man should have his little house, his automobile, and his wife will become more firmly entrenched than ever. The so-called masculinization of women, an idea that originated in America, supports my contention. Women have always been looked upon as equals in America and the masculinization of the American woman does not mean that she wants to be treated as an equal but that she wants to see the rules governing love more closely obeyed. The masculinization of woman means a conscious, enormous defeat for man, who virtually says, 'I will be a colorless husband. I will have no other wish than to make money. I will erase all erotic fancy from my mind, since fancy is always part of personal development. Personality is taboo. Long live the community!'

Look about you. From Socialism to Ford a wide roadway extends and at its sides are graves where the last shreds of love lie mouldering.

The author of *A Cultural History of the Modern Age*, a man whose name many Germans link with Spengler's, tells how he thinks history should be written. A paradoxical and stimulating essay.

TRUTH in History

By EGON FRIEDEL

Translated from the *Neue Freie Presse*
Vienna Liberal Daily

PEOPLE HAVE OFTEN and emphatically observed that although our present existence is dull and monotonous it is for that reason pleasant, comfortable, humane, and secure. This is a mistake. The nineteenth century was the inhumane century *par excellence*. The triumphant progress of technique has utterly mechanized us and stupefied us and through worship of money humanity has been universally and hopelessly impoverished. A world without God is not only the most senseless but also the most uncomfortable world imaginable. When modern times began, modern man entered the innermost circle of hell.

We are also told that we are more fully, more reliably, and more clearly informed concerning our present phase of development than we are concerning previous phases. Yet even this feeble consolation, if indeed it is a consolation, does not hold water. The creators of the modern era, men who might be said to have possessed two separate souls, can well be compared to fractional numbers that are no longer units but that are none the less comprehensible. The men of baroque times might in like manner be compared to irrational numbers, whose value can only be approximated by endless decimals. Continuing this parallel, nineteenth-century man might be compared to an imaginary number, like the square root of minus one, which is not only unreal but which we cannot even express. If, therefore, the so-called exact historians have difficulty in comprehending the past, the present is indeed a hopeless field. To write past history is barely possible; to write contemporary history is impossible.

because we are dealing with the existing, observable present and there is nothing more incomprehensible than the existing moment, nothing more unreal than physical existence. The mists of uncertainty do not disperse as we approach the present time, rather do they grow heavier, and we have as accurate a picture of our contemporaries as we have of the members of our immediate family, whom we love or, according to Freud, hate, but never understand.

Historic will, whose elements persist throughout all posterity, fulfills a steady process of distillation, and historians merely assist this excellent process with varying degrees of success. The remotest past is utterly suffused in the silver glow of poetry, which serves as an eternal and unassailable character witness proving that antiquity alone remains completely true. The more recent past constantly grows more true, thanks to the crystallizing, balancing, and cleansing progress of mankind's collective memory. It is, in short, becoming historical. But the history of the present is in its first stages of change and is interpreted only by lawyers in disguise, ill-natured trouble makers, and ingenuous experts whose conclusions are false or prejudiced and the fruit either of intimidation or their desire to appear pompous.

To obtain historic truth three things are necessary: a pious veneration for the holy quality of poetic history, a credulous trust in the sure judgment of traditional history, and a profound suspicion of all shortsighted critics and counterfeiters of contemporary history. The whole case has been summed up briefly by an English writer who said: 'Very nearly everything in history very nearly did not happen.' Less laconic, but no less definite, is Nietzsche's statement: 'The writer of history has nothing to do with what actually happened but only with imaginary experiences. His theme, world history so-called, consists of opinions on imaginary dealings and imaginary motives. All historians deal with things that never existed except as ideas.'

Only once must we ask ourselves resolutely what are the materials of which this so-called science of history is composed. In the first place, documents and records, including legal papers and parliamentary protocols, proclamations and government ordinances, constitutions and treaties, tariffs and customs, letters from officials, diplomatic dispatches, and any other relics that the field of diplomacy may contain; secondly, monuments, especially inscriptions, the kind of thing that coin collectors deal with; thirdly, the testimony of tradition, which consciously and intentionally endeavors to fortify historical recollection. Then, too, there are calendars and family trees, annals and chronicles, diaries and memoirs, biographies and historical works. All these historical sources, and I am saying nothing about unfixed or unfixable sources, become his-

torical documents by reason of the grasp and prejudice of the man who observes them. Without his labor they are merely a chaotic mass of interpretations, discoveries, contradictions, and unrelated facts. The first man to assign them a place,—and it is often a false place,—the first man to tie them all together turns them into history. For they are merely signs and symbols of facts and these facts themselves are neither true nor untrue, since they are both. They are all untrue in that they only existed, in a scientific sense, at the moment they occurred, and they are all true in that the expression of any given moment of life cannot be considered false. They become permanent possessions as they are absorbed in an historic consciousness, in any historic consciousness; for error is as immortal as knowledge.

Strictly speaking, the historian deals only with circumstantial evidence. 'One finds one's self in a state of self-deception,' writes Hermann Paul in his *Principles of the History of Language*, 'if one believes that the simplest historic fact can be stated without an ingredient of speculation. Man speculates even unconsciously and it is only through his happy instincts that he attains the truth.' It has been said that nature, in contrast to man, is always inarticulate, but to the scholar it is just the other way around. Nature gives him answers, man gives none or, what amounts to the same thing, too many and each one different. Jakob Burckhardt says in his *Observations on World History*, 'The sources are inexhaustible because they present a different aspect to each reader and to each century and even to each individual, depending on his age. But this is no misfortune. It is merely the result of the fact that life is always changing.'

IT IS indeed a piece of good fortune, for the charm and value of history reside in the fact that it never deals in natural things which can be subject to reckoning and experiment but always and only with things of the spirit, with living things that are forever changing and that are speaking a new language in every place and in every time. A Stygian stream, eternal and subterranean, flows from that which was to that which is and we call this stream world history. It is the collective work of a myriad-headed guild of poets that we call humanity. All memories that men retain can only take the form of poetry. Every song that goes from mouth to mouth, every anecdote that goes from ear to ear, every scribbled message, every individual word is already a poem, but it very naturally possesses a thousand kinds of significance. To hear these poems and then to have them elevated, rejuvenated, condensed, distorted, and enriched by other poets, this contact of dynamic poetic effects produces historic knowledge.

Schopenhauer has said, not without some bitterness, 'The incomplete character of world history is due to the fact that Cleo, its muse, is as thoroughly infected with lies as a streetwalker with syphilis. Modern

critical historical research endeavors to cure this disease, but with its local remedies it can only conquer occasional symptoms that break out here and there. Furthermore, a great deal too much quackery creeps in and aggravates the evil that already exists.'

This stupid, arrogant, and frequently dishonest quackery attained its peak in the school of Ranke, who was an historical genius but not on account of his scientific methods, for this so-called scientific method of writing history only served to cultivate a complete lack of fantasy and talent and stifled the naturally creative instincts. Ancient historians discovered speeches and situations that they regarded as characteristic. Impartially and with no thought of perpetrating a falsehood, since they were motivated only by sound feeling and since each fact seemed to them true in so far as it was pregnant, reasonable, and capable of burning each individual incident into one's memory, they tried to create a living, artistic masterpiece, not a dead, scientific description. The Greeks did not value the *Iliad* as literature but as a source of history, and the Middle Ages regarded their heroic ballads in the same way, while the chronicles, which endeavor to set down crude facts in the raw, resemble a primitive attempt at exact historical writing. These mediæval productions, as well as numberless works of Renaissance historians, draw no fundamental distinction between the symbolic truth of sagas and the hawking of 'real' news. Far into the eighteenth century the inclination still persisted to attach importance to our human devotion to fables and elaborations and to make history represent a combination of rhetoric and fiction.

Historical treatments of civilization have always possessed a certain fantastic character in that they tend to depict highly colored episodes in bright tones. Indeed, histories of this kind are themselves a part of history, being history seen through a temperament, and in principle are not remote from theological history, a point that Montesquieu made when he said that Voltaire wrote like a monk defending his church.

THE essence of the Ranke school, which for decades maintained itself as the only legitimate school of history and as the supreme triumph of the 'historic century,' resided in its childish respect for all printed and written matter. It thus differed from newspaper reporting in degree but not in kind. Any historic fact became more definitely established only in so far as more documentary 'evidence' accumulated in its behalf. Happily, however, the evolution of this system led to its own defeat, for, on the one hand, the accumulation of contradictory documents created confusion and, on the other hand, when these documents were not contradictory they led to false judgments, because in such instances they were generally plagiarisms.

The word 'exact,' which members of this school so often used, really

means that all these dispatches, notes, bulletins, circulars, and memorials were either written by damnable liars or ingenuous fools, men who either deformed the facts with which they dealt or failed to understand them. The one conclusion that any really critical intelligence could draw from all these documents would be that they represented nothing but chicanery and stupidity. That certain things happened exactly as they did is one conclusion that we can draw from past experience and this experience can also prove to us that the same things will recur in precisely the same way. For instance, I can state scientifically, which means precisely and with but one meaning, that Jupiter and Mars are in opposition or that a cannon ball travels at an average speed of 500 metres a second. But these are specific phenomena that can, and even must, recur. We believe, given the same conditions, that they will be repeated just as surely as we believe that they have happened.

In the case of an historic event, however, we cannot imagine that a repetition will occur, and this conviction of ours resides in the fact that each historic event is an individual experience, in other words, a spiritual experience. For in spiritual matters there are no repetitions. Nothing holds good for the future; nothing holds good for posterity. There is no such thing as a science of spiritual happenings, for they are not physical but metaphysical affairs and anyone who denies this either has no soul or, what is much more likely, has forgotten that he possesses one. Even in relation to nature the exact method fails if we try not only to think things through but to re-create them. If, for example, I wish to form a mental picture of a certain oak tree with which I am well acquainted, two courses are open to me: I can either go to the oak tree and make a source study of it, in the course of which I shall scientifically list all its peculiarities, or my memory can paint its well-remembered portrait to my inner eye. In the first instance I have followed the philological method; in the second, the historical. There is no doubt in my mind that the latter method of representation contains the greater element of truth.

Benedetto Croce, the Italian philosopher and historian, one of the wisest and most candid thinkers of our time, has made the following observations about 'philological' historical research. 'If one pursues this method of testimony to its fullest extent no witness remains free from suspicion and weakness, and if one arbitrarily admits certain witnesses for appearances' sake there is no contradiction one can avoid, for every contradiction can find support from some honest, straightforward, and intelligent man. In short, philology can never reveal the supernatural since its methods are based on prejudiced witnesses.'

BUT all witnesses are equally dubious and, on the other hand, all are equally useful, since even the most obvious falsehoods are historical ma-

terial, frequently of an eloquent and striking nature. Where, then, does historic truth lie? The answer is that we do not know. It is a mystery like all other mysteries. Certain events, figures, and ideas gradually become true in the course of history while others grow false. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that certain things become historically existent and others historically nonexistent. Certain events may come to play new rôles in the memory of posterity, arising unexpectedly like coral reefs and suddenly erupting like Vesuvius. They are births and therefore secrets. But the assumption that their existence depends on the collatings and compilings of archive investigators, burrowers in manuscripts, and book-worms would be as scurrilous a fallacy as chanticleer's conviction that his crowing makes the sun rise. Above all else and at all times, science at best fulfills the function of a midwife who merely makes the delivery more comfortable, resembling also a nature student who preserves some living thing in his alcohol by killing it first.

History is discovered afresh each day. It is constantly being modified and reinterpreted in accordance with contemporary views of the way the world is made. At this point we come upon a law that we have more than once observed, to wit, that spirit is the primary element and that reality is only its projection and materialization. America rose out of the sea at the very moment when European man had turned from searching for the secrets of his soul to the problem of his earthly dwelling place, at the same moment, in short, when he began to demand knowledge, not of God, but of the world. In the same period the telescope reached upward and its huge eye observed the shape and motions of the remotest stars. Later, when European man had decided to pursue a mechanical way of life, the raucous dead images of this new human type infested the planet. The air became filled with the thunder of pistons, the rattle of wheels, the scream of winches, the whirl of belted machinery, and with infinite clouds of smoke and steam. When Renaissance Italy yearned for its Roman past the 'holy' soil opened and yielded up hundreds of 'monuments' to delight the friends of art. When Goethe's German admirers tried to acquire Greek souls a magic charm seemed to dispel the mists of centuries.

How else could these ends have been attained without the soul? And to-day we are astonished that a whole continent which we once referred to as 'dark' is emerging into the light of day and, infused with the glow of our desire, is beginning to reëcho its traditions, many thousands of years old. Once again the 'historical witnesses' are present and they are present because the receptive spirit which creates them is present. Indeed, all 'historic events' are present, but most of them lie dead or seemingly dead, wrapped in profound legendary slumber, waiting to be aroused. History is not something that exists, as naïve science believes, but something that is steadily growing new day by day, changing, evolving, reshaping itself, rejuvenating itself, denying itself, developing and counterdeveloping just

as each individual becomes a new man every day, new to himself and to others.

In 1916 a very remarkable book appeared called *History as a Giver of Meaning to the Meaningless* by Theodor Lessing, a work worthy of Lucifer, wondrous in its sultry, nocturnal beauty and icy old in its logic, perhaps the best attempt to think through to the end what history really is. It had a two-edged sharpness, remaining irreverently faithful to its purpose as a work of self-fulfillment. With unbending consistency it reduced the philosophy of history to the same condition to which Spinoza reduced natural philosophy—to nothing. It was a cold-blooded, Pyrrhic victory of the mind, a mind that enjoyed its last and most refined triumph in suicide. It was a book to which the words of that earlier Lessing apply, 'great and abominable,' full of poison gas and fraught with grave dangers to anyone but a prudent plagiarist like myself.

The title contains its fundamental idea, that through history a continuity of causes steadily reveals itself as time goes on, but indirectly and without human material.

'History is the creation of this sense, the establishment of this continuity, the discovery of this development. It finds no meaning in the world; it gives a meaning to it. History is a *logificatio post factum*.' The concept of reality, according to Lessing, is not so simple as the historian believes. For the historian only considers real what 'documentary evidence reveals' and looks upon everything else as 'pure myth.' Some day, however, men will recognize 'that no exact reality can be produced except for machine creations, and that living experience is only lived and cannot be set down. Myth alone possesses an essential truth of a metaphysical kind, and compared to this truth historical reality is utterly untrue and false.'

ALL history has endeavored to grasp facts and to create a symbol from them. In other words, history is true but facts are merely real. Adapting this very illuminating observation to the present time, we are compelled to state that even its facts have not yet become real. In another part of his book Lessing says: 'Only when remembrance has wrought something together into a whole do we really preserve the poetic content of history. One first recognizes greatness as Moses recognized God—when it transforms itself.' And a hundred years ago Wilhelm von Humboldt remarked in his discussion of the historian's task: 'If one attempts to relate the most insignificant events but only sets down what really happened, one soon notices how many falsities or uncertainties arise. That is why nothing is so rare as a literally accurate exposition. For that reason historic truth somewhat resembles distant clouds taking shape before one's eyes. Hence, too, the facts of history in their immediate surrounding circumstances are

little more than the results of traditions and researches which man has agreed to consider as true.' But as these clouds gather to astonish, delight, and educate posterity the process becomes transcendent. The spirit of God forms their texture, 'which we first recognize when He has transformed Himself.'

The recognition that history is poetry has never quite vanished from human consciousness, but it is more peculiar to our own time than to many previous periods. In any case, we feel it more than the period immediately preceding our own did, since that period was dominated by a blind faith in reality in every field and thus concerned only with facts in historical matters. But the nineteenth century did not usurp the throne of history, it only removed history from a place to which it was not suited. The historical writer of the past generation who called himself positivistic was in reality extremely negative, destructive, and skeptical. His method met the same fate that overtook the so-called 'sense of reality' in every sphere, because we can only purchase intensive knowledge of certain unimportant episodes with the loss of everything else.

Dumas *père* said of Macaulay that he had raised history to the height of fiction, but it was not necessary for Macaulay to perform this task of elevation, since it achieves itself with the passage of time. The fact that we refer to periods two or three thousand years ago as antiquity is due to the same naïve perspective that makes us look upon our grandfathers as old men under all circumstances, whereas in reality they are undoubtedly younger than ourselves, that is to say, warmer, less complicated, more childish. Men of times gone by, the contemporaries of the Merovingians or the Medicis, are really younger than we, just as lizards and fish are younger than rodents, the former being infantile by comparison, although, or rather because, they came into existence earlier. And for that reason ancient history is history in a higher and purer sense than recent or present history, just as the history of our childhood and youth is truer than the history of our ripe or our overripe years. Indeed, every one of us has an undeniable feeling that his life was more real, more vivid, when he was young, although the 'sources' are much rarer and although documents are virtually nonexistent. Hence the enthusiasm that antiquity arouses as a field for historical activity, and hence also the coolness with which we observe present circumstances. But in like manner the present will one day become young and truth and beauty will glow about it. Every period will become a golden age before our gilded view, but it must be sufficiently remote. For it exists in the one place where all things really exist—in the spirit.

But the present, which the mist of proximity renders gray and impenetrable, lacks color just as it lacks clarity. All it possesses is the glassy shimmer of idiosyncrasy.

LETTERS AND THE ARTS

KEYSERLING HOLDS FORTH

FRESH from a lecture tour through Spain, Count Hermann Keyserling was caught on the wing in Paris by a French interviewer and prevailed upon to discuss various matters of moment. First of all, the visiting philosopher denied harboring any partiality for Asiatic thought: 'I was never interested in Asiatic thought. People have said that I was, but people say so many things. Ten books have been written about me. Why couldn't they wait until I am dead? To be sure I did, at a certain moment, feel the need of Asia to help me express myself. We see novelists who go to Peking to search for inspiration. But do they become Chinese? No doubt my *Travel Diary* made people mistake me for an apostle of Oriental thought. Actually, however, nobody has a less Oriental spirit than mine: I am violently Occidental.'

During his visit to Spain, the Count naturally had to give the natives the benefit of his advice. 'In Spain I wanted to orient the minds of the people toward reconstituting the Iberian spiritual empire. "The mission of you Spaniards," I said, "is to form a national soul for yourselves." That, in brief, is the way I talked to them. I am sure that I did not go against their interests. The Spanish race can only achieve grandeur from the exaltation of its own qualities, qualities that regionalism develops. The regionalist formula will regenerate Spain. And the same thing is true of all countries. The world draws its intellectual wealth from its differences. The leveling of all civilizations would be fatal to the spirit. Each nation must guard and accentuate its own character.'

Keyserling then gave his opinion of internationalism. 'I am against internationalism. For internationalism is sterile. It's like a mule. To make purely exterior

agreements to prevent wars is all right. To set up a customs union is a good thing, too. But to make all Europe the image of Switzerland would be a mistake. Let us not try to equalize nations nor to equalize naturally distinct regions within individual nations. I am an anticollectivist.'

Which, of course, led at once to a discussion of Russia and America. 'Look at Soviet Russia and America, physiologically two equal types, two nations absolutely parallel, both of them collectivist. Undoubtedly they hate each other, but just as Catholics and Protestants hated each other during the religious wars, since both were mystical. Of course there is no real equality in Russia; castes survive in another form: Soviet dictatorship has created the most undemocratic country in the world. Russia is not in the least socialist except by constraint. America is socialistic by instinct. Americans are born idealists. They are really the only socialists in the world and the formula of their socialism is the only acceptable one. But because their means of arriving at the same ideal are different, Russia and America fight each other. This struggle may go on for three or four hundred years. It is a matter of Russo-American polarity. There lies the real history of our epoch and of times to come—there is no other.'

As for Europe, it can only find salvation in cultivating the intellect. 'In spite of many rivalries, mediæval Christianity succeeded in coöperating on the Crusades. This spiritual unity no longer exists. Even the world of Islam is breaking up. What next? Europe caught between two collectivist forces, Russia and America, can only find salvation in intellectual differentiation between her various peoples, for that is the only way that values are created.'

MOISSI IN LONDON

ALEXANDER MOISSI, whose South Slavic temperament has helped to make him one of the foremost actors on the German stage, fulfilled a long-cherished ambition when he finally made his first London appearance early this summer after having played in every capital in Europe and in North and South America. Discovered in his hotel by an interviewer from the *Observer* he gave his opinions on various theatrical topics, praising in particular Shaw and Shakespeare. He declared that he had acted *Hamlet* more than a thousand times and keeps reading it over in English although his performances are always given in German. He has recently been playing the part of Captain Stanhope in the Vienna production of *Journey's End*, having made a flying visit to London last fall to inspect the original British production of the play. Asked if he thought that the talking pictures were affecting the legitimate stage, Moissi made this reply:—

'They did at first, and they may again in the future, but at the moment people are disillusioned about the talkies. Most of them are so bad. On the whole, the theatre is much the same all over Europe; good plays are successful, and bad plays lose money. The difference in the various countries is chiefly one of personality, not of technique. The Moscow Art Theatre has been the great influence on the modern theatre. I am glad you are going to see the Pitoëffs at the Globe Theatre, after I leave. Ludmilla Pitoëff is one of the greatest actresses I have ever seen. She is an extraordinary person—the mother of seven children and very tiny, yet she has the force of a lion! Her Saint Joan is wonderful.'

The name of Bernard Shaw elicited his rapturous enthusiasm: 'I am his greatest admirer,' Moissi announced. 'To say he is the greatest force in Europe is to be merely banal. The *Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism* is the star—how do you say?—the guiding star for humanity to-day and for the future. I

have acted in his plays but have never met him. I hope to do so while I am in London.'

Moissi is at present immersed in the study of Napoleon, since he plans to act next season in a drama called *Napoleon at St. Helena* now being written by a German dramatist.

GEORGE MOORE'S NEW PLAY

THE BRITISH PUBLIC will shortly have the opportunity to read and perhaps even to see a new play by George Moore, who has again turned to Biblical times for his inspiration. The piece will be entitled *The Passing of the Essenes* and the plot has to do with the activities of Saint Paul and Jesus, who, according to Mr. Moore, did not die on the cross. Here is the way the author describes his odd story:—

'The play is called *The Passing of the Essenes*, and is founded upon an incident in *The Brook Kerith*, but nine-tenths of it is new material. It is in three acts, and the whole takes place in twelve hours. Paul has been hunted out of Jericho for preaching his doctrines, and he and Timothy have been pursued through the hills and have escaped across the Jordan. During the night they miss each other, and Paul takes shelter in the valley through which the brook Kerith runs. The Essenes take him in, provide him with rest and food, and Jesus and a shepherd go in search of Timothy. After he has eaten Paul tells the extraordinary story of the man who was raised from the dead, and when Jesus returns he finds that the Essenes are divided against each other. The dramatic point of the play is when they tell Paul that the Jesus who was on the cross is there in the cavern.'

The public performance of the play depends on the attitude of the Lord Chamberlain, who may object to the character of Jesus as Mr. Moore delineates it, but the author has no doubt that his work will be presented in France, Germany, and the United States. The Arts Theatre Club in London has also defi-

nately arranged for a private representation. No less definite and unorthodox than his views on Christ are Mr. Moore's opinions concerning a National Theatre for whose construction Mr. Granville Barker is urging the Government to appropriate two million pounds. 'Why does Mr. Granville Barker want to spend two millions on a National Theatre?' Mr. Moore inquired.

'There are two millions of people unemployed, and the country is in a dreadful state, yet he is asking for four walls and a stage in which to produce masterpieces. There are no masterpieces being written. You cannot assist art, and you cannot repress art. If you look into history you will find that is true. If a man has it in him to write a play or paint a picture, to put up four walls will not help him. National galleries did not produce great pictures. They were painted because the artists wanted to paint them. Wagner did not compose great operas because there was a building in which they could be performed. The whole world was against him, and he probably did better work for that reason. You cannot help art. The whole thing is ridiculous. If people want to see Shakespeare he is performed. Shaw does not need a National Theatre. Why, they perform his plays in the King's Road and in Birmingham and Manchester.'

'ENCYCLOPÆDIA ITALIANA'

ITALY'S ENDEAVORS to establish herself as a first-class power have extended to many fields and sometimes have given rise to alarm. But not always. Two distinguished senators, Giovanni Trec-

cani and Giovanni Gentile, have awakened no fears whatever by organizing an institution which will publish an Italian encyclopædia comprising thirty-six volumes of a thousand pages each. Several of these volumes have already appeared, but the set will not be complete until 1937. The material that goes into it has been divided into fifty-five sections which include such subjects as Italian language and literature, ancient and Oriental history, physics, chemistry, mathematics, archæology, philosophy, economics, medicine, law, and architecture. The encyclopædia does not represent a slapdash collection of curiosities but will be a complete and organic whole on which many experts, all of them Italian, will have collaborated—senators, deputies, professors, army officers, and almost all the members of the newly established Italian Acadèmy.

Senator Gentile has written an introduction pointing out that the first attempt to launch such a work was made in 1848, and he explains how the movement was revived after the War and finally came to be realized in 1925. Mussolini has announced that 'the Italian encyclopædia is an enterprise that does honor to the régime' and the Pope and King Albert of Belgium have also praised it highly. What will distinguish this work from all others of a similar nature is its purely national character, since the declared aim of the encyclopædia is to present the life and history of Italy in all its aspects. No such complete summary exists and when the *Encyclopædia Italiana* is complete, Fascists and scholars can for once join hands and celebrate.

AS OTHERS SEE US

AMERICA'S MONOTONOUS FACES

R. J. CRUIKSHANK, one of the many Englishmen to have visited the United States in recent years, has been comparing the faces that he saw in America with those in England. Here are some of his conclusions:—

The most interesting things in life after love and religion are the food one eats and the faces one looks at. In American cities, the food is infinite in its variety and lovely as a dream. But in American cities, outside New York, the types of faces seem to be growing almost as strictly limited as the makes of cars. This is disturbing.

I have been looking at a large number of eyes, noses, mouths, chins, and foreheads in Liverpool, Manchester, and London, and on the railway platforms at Derby and Nottingham. Comparing them in my mind with an equal number of quite admirable American eyes, noses, mouths, chins, and foreheads, I realized that the first set belongs to people who like being different from their neighbors, while the second belongs to people who, broadly speaking, all want to do the same thing at the same time.

One day America may have one single face. This will be not at all like the marvelous, long face of Lincoln, thought-worn and tender. It will be a round, fattish face, with a jolly smile flashing on and off like electric light. It will be a Middle-Western face, and it will have few lines but quite a number of creases. It will be very pleasant and good-natured, but oh so redundant.

This is the price that will be paid for standardizing human furniture and human thoughts, for the mass production of automobiles and of ideas, for building a thousand cities that are exactly the same down to the last petrol pump and the last hot-dog stand. The mass production

of the universal face will be the final achievement of the radio and the film.

The third generation of European immigrants, seen in American public schools, tends toward a uniformity of face and feature suggesting the work of a heavenly Henry Ford. I have seen children of Italians, Swedes, Germans, and Greeks sitting side by side, looking almost alike, and talking exactly the same. Impressive thought!

There are many more beautiful faces in America than Europe credits. Paris women are as ugly as the Dark Lady of the sonnets compared with the matchless creatures who glide up and down Fifth Avenue. Yet most of them are as brittle and frigid as porcelain figures, and they are just as similar. The standard is fixed and irrevocable, and rather Chinese.

London and our other cities rejoice one by chins that refuse to conform to standards, and noses that perkily insist on going their own way. All the life in a New York face is concentrated in the eyes—brilliant, questing, X-raying eyes. Here, on our English streets, we have rocky chins that insist on finding things out for themselves, noses that refuse to be browbeaten, skeptical mouths that question the established order of things, fantastic eyebrows that are forever going for voyages of exploration through a wrinkled expanse of forehead, lean profiles that are as vivid as gargoyles.

A Kansas face thinks it no shame to be identical with a California face. Not for the traveler in America such a joy as comes when one beholds a Yorkshire nose ostentatiously dissociating itself from a Lancashire chin.

America will doubtless build up a magnificent civilization on the principle of everybody doing the same thing at the same time. Ancient China appears to have done much the same thing very successfully, and the plan has many beauties

and many advantages. Those, however, who prefer their street with a difference will like Piccadilly better than Broadway.

AMERICA OR RUSSIA?

GEORGES DUHAMEL, a French doctor who enjoys a considerable reputation as a novelist, has just written a book called *Scènes de la Vie Future* in which he has some rather harsh things to say about the United States. He describes some of his misadventures during a recent visit to America and in the last chapter draws this comparison with Russia:—

Western Europe is gaping with amazement and even with horror at the experiments which are being conducted in Russia and America. Travelers, economists, philosophers, and sociologists enjoy comparing these two experiments in the hope of enlightening themselves by such a contrast of ideas.

But these experiments are not comparable. The one in Russia is purely political and ideological and at present comprises a thousand domestic and foreign factors. The artisans who are responsible for that country seem, at heart, to be bent on discrediting it and delivering it over to despotism and defeat.

The American experiment, on the other hand, avoids political terms. It is concerned instead with morals, science, and religion, and represents a civilization, a way of life, rather than a mere régime. It includes everything, and affects every human being in all the phases of his existence. Yet it is simple in appearance and shows itself to other nations only in elemental, powerful, attractive images. It can be sharply defined in a dozen precepts, while the Russian experiment is an unstable structure erected on enormous doctrinaire tracts that no one in the world thinks of reading.

The American experiment is triumphant, sure of its future. It is rarely discussed, for it is universally respected.

Save that it is something that is being pursued and developed, one would scarcely call it an experiment, but rather a handful of rules. To certain people it represents a method; to others, a gospel.

Scattered everywhere in an infinite variety of forms, the American method has the whole world for its field. It seems, at first sight, compatible with any political system. It adjusts itself to everything, undertakes everything, accomplishes everything. It is even beginning to colonize Soviet Russia, merely, one might say, as a further experiment. Perhaps its greatest efficacy lies in the fact that it enchants simple souls and delights children. Every child I know thinks in American terms when it comes to money, pleasure, glory, power, and work.

AN INNOCENT ABROAD

UNDER THIS TITLE the *Week-end Review* of London prints the following jingle on American place names borrowed from the Old World and from classical antiquity.

AN INNOCENT ABROAD

By C. A. L. Cliffe

How would Cleopatra be
As queen in Memphis (Tennessee)?
Did Solomon, old Balkis' pal,
Get his gold from Ophir (Cal.)?
Would Athenians fight and die
To enter Syracuse (N. Y.)?
And could you find a helot still
Promenading Sparta (Ill.)?
Does Pennsylvanian Lancaster
Dare neighbor York to war with her?
And, say, if at a second birth
Sophocles came back to earth,
Where think you he would seek a home
(Of course, disdaining upstart Rome)?
Athens (Texas), Athens (Ken.),
Athens (Michigan or Tenn.)?
Athens (Minn.) or Athens (Ga.)?
Athens (Al.) or Athens (Pa.)?
Or would he not, in quest of peace,
Return, perhaps, to Athens (Greece)?

CORRESPONDENCE

FAIRFAX HARRISON, president of the Southern Railway, writes us this fine letter:—

P. O. Box 1808
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO THE EDITOR:—

You have, I venture to say with respect, restored an old tradition. I may not be able to share your high hope of promoting international understanding, for in that respect you are fighting the beast at Ephesus; but I do recognize that you are doing an excellent work of education, and I salute you with friendship and respect.

Yours faithfully,
FAIRFAX HARRISON

An experienced worker for world peace, Professor Robert C. Root, head of the department of economics and sociology at the College of the Pacific in Stockton, California, former representative at many national peace congresses, and a recipient of the International Conciliation Association's bronze medal, feels that *THE LIVING AGE* is successfully promoting by the 'indirect method' the cause to which he has devoted a large part of his life:—

STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA

TO THE EDITOR:—

While I was engaged in the work for international peace and good will among the nations of the world (1908 to 1918), I found that the 'indirect method' often worked quite as well as the direct approach. Hence, I can both appreciate and approve of your method of dealing with that problem through the medium of *THE LIVING AGE*; for we need to know the points of view of the leaders in the other countries of the world in order to know what is the best course for our own country to pursue in seeking peace with all nations.

It is also true that many otherwise quite intelligent citizens of our own land are poorly informed as to what has already been done for peace and good will by our country and other countries also. Therefore, some of the

most outstanding things already accomplished for world peace should be more widely known and the indirect method seems to be almost the only way to present such facts. But certainly our citizens do need to know more about the conditions and views prevailing in other countries of our world community.

Very sincerely,
ROBERT C. ROOT

From Major General William Lassiter, commander of the Eighth Corps Area in Fort Sam Houston, Texas, comes warm commendation for our policy of reprinting articles from leading European publications:—

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH CORPS AREA
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS

TO THE EDITOR:—

THE LIVING AGE now gives me what I want, namely, a collection of articles from the best European journals as to important events and tendencies in various parts of the world. I also read with interest your summary of events given in the beginning of each issue and I would be glad to see these remarks cover a wider range.

I am taking every opportunity to recommend *THE LIVING AGE* to people whom I think it would interest and I hope to see a broad clientele built up.

Wishing you every success, I am

Yours very sincerely,

WM. LASSITER
Major General, U. S. Army

In our last issue we printed three letters from presidents of state universities which contained helpful and gratifying criticisms. Since then two more letters from university presidents have come in, one from Utah, the other from Montana. Truly the message of *THE LIVING AGE* spreads as widely as the sources from which the magazine itself is drawn. Here is what President Thomas of Utah has to say:—

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY

TO THE EDITOR:—

I have read almost every issue of *THE LIVING AGE* and would say that I have read 75 per cent of the articles in each. I have found it a very informing magazine with material of very high order. For people interested in international affairs it is almost indispensable. I can commend the magazine most highly.

Sincerely yours,
GEORGE THOMAS, *President*

Next is a suggestion that may strike responsive chords in other readers—if it does, we should like to hear from them so that their wishes may receive still further consideration. President Clapp of Montana misses the short stories that we used to print from time to time and that we gradually had to eliminate from our semimonthly issues. But now that we are returning to a monthly publication date—as announced in our ‘Guide Post’—the question of resuming the short story again comes to the fore:—

THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
MISSOULA, MONTANA

TO THE EDITOR:—

I think the present magazine unique and useful and certainly interesting. In comparison with the original magazine, the only thing I miss is an occasional translation of an outstanding story of contemporary life. I believe such a story once a month would perhaps further the purpose you have in mind for the magazine. Of the features of the new magazine that have been discontinued, the only one I miss is the ‘Calendar of Events,’ which may have been somewhat of a duplication; but the one in *THE LIVING AGE* was the best calendar of foreign events that I knew of. I trust that in attempting to use no ‘definite propaganda’ you do not give up the excellent editorial comment.

You are to be congratulated on the magazine. The objective or ideal you have set up is most worth while and I believe the magazine is certainly helping in bringing about a better understanding in the United States of foreign problems.

Sincerely,
C. H. CLAPP, *President*

In our attempt to give all the important expressions of foreign opinion a fair hearing we naturally arouse a few protests. In our last issue a letter from Mr. Upton Sinclair urged us to devote more space to radical causes abroad and criticized us for having favored ‘the interests.’ Now comes a letter from Colonel Francis E. Drake, an American resident of Paris, asserting that our articles reveal a ‘socialistic’ trend.

24 RUE MARBEAU
PARIS, FRANCE

TO THE EDITOR:—

I suppose my comments will be considered by you as unjust, but nevertheless I have the feeling that the trend of your publication is gradually but positively ‘socialistic.’

Your response may quote the title of your publication, and you may remind me that this age is growing socialistic; you will also no doubt inform me that such a magazine must be an open forum for all intelligent and intellectual discussion.

FRANCIS E. DRAKE

The Honorable George J. Ryan, president of the Board of Education of the City of New York, analyzes our task with discernment and offers interesting criticisms of several recent articles:—

BOARD OF EDUCATION
THE CITY OF NEW YORK

TO THE EDITOR:—

There are already too many publications that have sacrificed ideals for circulation, and I sincerely hope there will be no change in the present policy of *THE LIVING AGE*. Your purpose to bring the problems of European nations to the sympathetic attention of the American public is a laudable one and one that cannot help but promote a closer understanding among the leaders of thought in every country.

A full appreciation of England’s present-day problems is possible from the very excellent article, ‘England on Four Fronts,’ in the May 15th issue, and no one could read it without acquiring a more sympathetic attitude toward England’s position on international questions. It is a lack of appreciation of the other country’s viewpoint that causes most if not all international difficulties, some of which lead to war.

The article on 'Ford through German Eyes' is most enlightening and the piece relative to what the Labor Party is trying to do for unemployment in England is one that while painting a somewhat gloomy picture indicates the seriousness of the unemployment problem and illustrates the need for economic coöperation among all nations.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE J. RYAN
President, Board of Education

The Honorable John Lowndes McLaurin, former Senator from South Carolina, encourages us in our work by the intimation that he considers *THE LIVING AGE* 'indispensable to the man who desires a world view of current affairs.' Senator McLaurin mentions, in passing, the article on Prohibition that appeared in our June 1st number. Our two pieces on that subject, the first a savage attack on the Volstead Act by a British dry and the second a calmer appraisal of the actual results of our 'noble experiment,' brought us in more comments than anything we have printed in a long time. Here are Mr. McLaurin's views:

MYRTLE BEACH
SOUTH CAROLINA

TO THE EDITOR:—

I have just finished reading the June number and was particularly pleased at the article on Prohibition because it was the detached view of an English correspondent. This is such a vital question that both sides at home are fanatical and unreasonable.

Wishing you great success in your effort to make the magazine indispensable to the man who desires a world view of current affairs,

I am sincerely,
JOHN LOWNDES McLAURIN

THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

nations as this would be handicapping himself unnecessarily when it came to justifying his own measures for defense. For this reason, MARCEL RAY's article, *CENTRAL EUROPE IN DISTRESS*, may perhaps be taken with somewhat less than the usual grain of salt. He finds Germany and the Succession States suffering from an economic malady for which coöperation is the only cure. And he admits that his concern is partly selfish; for when he recommends a doctor (who looks very much like M. Briand with a program for a United States of Europe under his arm), he does so because he fears that the disease will spread to his own country.

NO BETTER example of the English political mind at work than the Simon Report has been vouchsafed the world in recent years. If there are few Americans who can spare the time to read the two volumes of the Report itself (it can be had from the British Library of Information in New York for eighty cents a volume), there are many who will enjoy its effect upon other English minds. The three views which we present in this issue under the general title *SIMON AND INDIA* are hot off the British presses. They give a useful indication of the kind of debate that is likely to come in Parliament. The United States has its colonial problems as well as Great Britain. Should they become acute, it will be fortunate if an American Simon is found to aid in their solution.

WAR AND PEACE

In human affairs no realization ever matches the vision, and limitation of arms is not a single step but a continuous process. But the treaty is a long step forward in that evolutionary process. It prescribes a complete limitation and a cessation of competitive building between the navies of America, Britain, and Japan—the three greatest naval powers of the world.—*The Honorable Henry L. Stimson, U. S. Secretary of State, with reference to the London Naval Treaty.*

Like the United States, Germany is striving to make the world safe from a recurrence of the cataclysm which would without fail put an end to our civilization. And just as there is identity of purpose, so there is identity with regard to the methods to be applied. Mindful of the old proverb that an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure, we are less concerned with the question of how a possible violator of the peace ought to be dealt with than with the all-important problem of preventing the outbreak of any armed conflict the consequences of which nobody is able to foresee.—*Foreign Minister Curtius of Germany.*

Just as the American investment public showed its wisdom five and a half years ago in materially assisting, through the Dawes Plan, to put Germany upon its feet, so now it is showing its readiness to coöperate in the new German loan, believing that its action will be another step in reaffirming Germany's credit; in the assistance given to America's foreign trade; in making concrete and effective the Locarno treaties; but most of all in the financial liquidation of the War and in building firm foundations for the new epoch of economic and political peace in Europe.—*Thomas W. Lamont, international banker and former member of the Committee of Experts in Paris.*

If the current books and plays which are bringing in a golden harvest to various writers, publishers, and speculators give a true picture of the British Army in the World War, it would seem that next Armistice Day the representatives of the nation should go to the Cenotaph, give thanks to God that a million of our men were killed, and express regret that any came home.—*Sir Frank Fox, Australian War veteran and former member of British General Staff.*

Peace thrives in a world of contentment and mutual welfare. It cannot live in a world or in a nation where there are great inequalities and injustices caused by man-made barriers.—*Owen D. Young, in a public address delivered in San Francisco, California.*

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